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INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, China has played pivotal roles in 
developing initiatives such as the BRICS Summit,1 the Regional 
                                                                                                               
* Copyright © 2019 Peter K. Yu. Professor of Law, Professor of Communication, and 
Director, Center for Law and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M University. Earlier versions 
of this Article were presented at the 2018 University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review 
Symposium at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, the 26th Annual Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy Conference at Fordham University School of Law, the 9th Asia-
Pacific Innovation Conference at the Delhi School of Economics in India, and the 2019 
Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in New Orleans. The Author 
is grateful to the participants of these events for valuable comments and suggestions and to 
Hugh Hansen for the repeated invitations to the Fordham conference. 
 1 Featuring the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the 
annual BRICS summit has been held in New Delhi (India), Durban (South Africa), Fortaleza 
(Brazil), Ufa (Russia), Goa (India), Xiamen (China), and Johannesburg (South Africa). See 
Peter K. Yu, A Half-Century of Scholarship on the Chinese Intellectual Property System, 67 
AM. U. L. REV. 1045, 1116 (2018) [hereinafter Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship] (noting the 
past BRICS summits); see also Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property Negotiations, the BRICS 
Factor and the Changing North-South Debate, in THE BRICS-LAWYERS’ GUIDE TO GLOBAL 
COOPERATION 148 (Rostam J. Neuwirth et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter BRICS-LAWYERS’ 
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Comprehensive Economic Partnership2 (RCEP), the New 
Development Bank,3 and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.4  
China has also negotiated a number of bilateral and regional free trade 
agreements (FTAs), connecting the country to markets in Asia, 
Australasia, Europe, South America, and other parts of the world.5  
Many of these agreements include provisions or chapters on 
intellectual property protection and enforcement.6 
                                                                                                               
GUIDE] (discussing the “BRICS factor” in international trade and intellectual property 
negotiations). For discussions of the BRICS countries, see generally BRICS AND 
DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES: INNOVATION SYSTEMS AND POLICIES (José Eduardo 
Cassiolato & Virgínia Vitorino eds., 2011); BRICS-LAWYERS’ GUIDE, supra; ANDREW F. 
COOPER, THE BRICS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2016); AMRITA NARLIKAR, 
NEWPOWERS: HOW TO BECOME ONE AND HOW TO MANAGE THEM (2010); JIM O’NEILL, THE 
GROWTH MAP: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE BRICS AND BEYOND (2011). 
 2 For the Author’s discussions of the RCEP negotiations, see generally Peter K. Yu, 
The RCEP Negotiations and Asian Intellectual Property Norm Setters, in THE FUTURE OF 
ASIAN TRADE DEALS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Liu Kung-Chung & Julien Chaisse eds., 
forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Yu, Asian Norm Setters]; Peter K. Yu, TPP, RCEP, and the 
Crossvergence of Asian Intellectual Property Standards, in GOVERNING SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: REGULATORY DIVERGENCE 
AND CONVERGENCE IN THE AGE OF MEGAREGIONALS 277 (Peng Shin-yi et al. eds., 2018) 
[hereinafter Yu, Crossvergence]; Peter K. Yu, TPP, RCEP and the Future of Copyright 
Normsetting in the Asia-Pacific, in MAKING COPYRIGHT WORK FOR THE ASIAN PACIFIC? 
JUXTAPOSING HARMONISATION WITH FLEXIBILITY 19 (Susan Corbett & Jessica C. Lai eds., 
2018) [hereinafter Yu, Copyright Normsetting]; Peter K. Yu, The RCEP and Trans-Pacific 
Intellectual Property Norms, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 673 (2017) [hereinafter Yu, RCEP 
and Trans-Pacific Norms]. 
 3 “China is . . . a founding member of the New Development Bank (NDB) consisting 
of the so-called BRICS countries . . . .The NDB, established in July 2015, is . . . intended 
[for] lending money for infrastructure projects to developing countries.” Daniel C. K. Chow, 
Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1255, 1273 n.111 (2016); see also id. (discussing the New Development Bank). See 
generally Christiane Itabaiana Martins et al., The BRICS Bank: On the Edge of International 
Economic Law and the New Challenges of Twenty-first Century, in BRICS-LAWYERS’ 
GUIDE, supra note 1, at 180 (discussing the BRICS Bank). 
 4 See Chow, supra note 3, at 1286–96 (discussing how China could use the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank as a tool to further its policy goals). 
 5 For discussions of China’s free trade agreements, see generally THE CHINA-
AUSTRALIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A 21ST-CENTURY MODEL (Colin Picker et al. eds., 
2018); Henry Gao, The RTA Strategy of China: A Critical Visit, in CHALLENGES TO 
MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND REGIONAL 
AGREEMENTS 53 (Ross Buckley et al. eds., 2008); Marc Lanteigne, Northern Exposure: 
Cross-Regionalism and the China–Iceland Preferential Trade Negotiations, 202 CHINA Q. 
362 (2010); Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953 (2011) 
[hereinafter Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements]. 
 6 See infra text accompanying notes 25–27. 
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One new initiative that has not received much scholarly and 
policy attention from intellectual property commentators7 concerns 
the slowly emerging “One Belt, One Road” Initiative,8 which has now 
been officially translated as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).9  
Launched in fall 2013, this initiative features two distinct routes: the 
land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the sea-based 21st-century 
Maritime Silk Road.  As David Shambaugh described: 
[The BRI sought] to build infrastructure and facilitate 
commercial “connectivity” from northwestern China 
across Eurasia and from southeast China to Africa and 
the eastern Mediterranean.  Through [this and other] 
initiatives, China is meticulously constructing an 
alternative and parallel global institutional 
architecture to the postwar western order.10 
This Article aims to introduce this new initiative to 
intellectual property literature.  Part I documents the recent changes 
                                                                                                               
 7 Some rare exceptions are Lee Jyh-an, The New Silk Road to Global IP Landscape, 
in LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 417 (Lutz-Christian Wolff & 
Xi Chao eds., 2016) [hereinafter LEGAL DIMENSIONS]; Peter K. Yu, China, the “Belt and 
Road” and Intellectual Property Cooperation, 14 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 
(forthcoming 2019). 
 8 For book-length treatments of this initiative, see generally BELT AND ROAD: A 
CHINESE WORLD ORDER (Bruno Maçães ed., 2019); CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVES 
AND ITS NEIGHBORING DIPLOMACY (Zhang Jie ed. & Xu Mengqi trans., 2017) [hereinafter 
CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVES]; CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD: INITIATIVE, 
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS (Bal Kishan Sharma & Nivedita Das Kundu eds., 2016) 
[hereinafter CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD]; CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD INITIATIVE (Lim 
Tai-Wei ed., 2016); CHINA’S PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ONE 
BELT, ONE ROAD INITIATIVE (Anoushiravan Ehteshami & Niv Horesh eds., 2018) 
[hereinafter CHINA’S PRESENCE IN MIDDLE EAST]; INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THE 
RULE OF LAW IN CHINA UNDER THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (Zhao Yun ed., 2018) 
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE]; MAPPING CHINA’S “ONE BELT ONE ROAD” 
INITIATIVE (Li Xing ed., 2019) [hereinafter MAPPING CHINA’S OBOR INITIATIVE]; TOM 
MILLER, CHINA’S ASIAN DREAM (2017); RETHINKING THE SILK ROAD: CHINA’S BELT AND 
ROAD INITIATIVE AND EMERGING EURASIAN RELATIONS (Maximilian Mayer ed., 2018) 
[hereinafter RETHINKING SILK ROAD]; WANG YIWEI, THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: WHAT 
WILL CHINA OFFER THE WORLD IN ITS RISE (2016). 
 9 See NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N ET AL., VISION AND ACTIONS ON JOINTLY 
BUILDING SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT AND 21ST-CENTURY MARITIME SILK ROAD (2015) 
[hereinafter VISION AND ACTIONS] (providing the official translation of a guiding document 
issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce, with the State Council’s authorization). 
 10 DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA’S FUTURE 162–63 (2016). 
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to China’s approach toward international intellectual property norm 
setting.  This Part highlights three notable developments that have 
greatly enhanced the country’s ability to shape future norms in this 
area: the negotiation of bilateral and regional FTAs, the establishment 
of the RCEP, and the launch of the BRI.  Part II recognizes the key 
analytical challenges concerning the BRI and outlines five sets of 
inquiries that could help enhance our understanding of the initiative.  
This Part points out that the initiative’s lack of development in the 
intellectual property area has presented a rare opportunity to shape its 
future.  In view of this opportunity, Part III examines six distinct areas 
of potential cooperation: substantive standards, procedural 
arrangements, cross-border enforcement, dispute resolution, 
technical cooperation, and market aggregation.  Focusing on each 
area in turn, this Part highlights some of the BRI’s potential 
constructive possibilities.  This Article concludes by briefly 
identifying three distinct camps that subscribe to very different views 
on the initiative’s prospects and perils. 
I.     China’s Changing International Approach11 
In the past two decades, China’s international profile has been 
changing rapidly.  Although the country has become more active 
following its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO),12 its 
involvement has remained tentative until recently.  This tentative 
position can be attributed to a confluence of factors, including the 
Chinese leaders’ priority focus on domestic matters, the country’s 
need to cultivate goodwill from its neighbors, the complications 
created by the changing Chinese political leadership, the WTO-plus 
concessions China had made when it joined the international trading 
body, and the highly uneven developments within the country.13 
                                                                                                               
 11 This Part draws on research from Peter K. Yu, The Rise of China in the International 
Intellectual Property Regime, in HANDBOOK ON THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF CHINA 424 (Zeng Ka ed., 2019) [hereinafter Yu, Rise of China]. 
 12 China became the 143rd member of the WTO in December 2001. See Press Release, 
World Trade Org., WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China’s Accession (Nov. 11, 
2001), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm [https://perma.cc/884L-
A7HY] (announcing China’s admission to the WTO). 
 13 See Peter K. Yu, The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR. 
REV. INT’L L. 209, 229–37 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Middle Kingdom] (discussing these 
factors). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol14/iss3/1
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To some extent, China’s international approach in the first 
decade and a half following the WTO accession has been guided by 
Deng Xiaoping’s plea for self-restraint.  As he reportedly said after 
the 1989 Tiananmen incident: “[W]atch and analyze developments 
calmly; secure our own positions; deal with change with confidence; 
conceal our capacities; be good at keeping a low profile; never 
become the leader.”14  To a large extent, the emphasis on “taoguang 
yanghui”—or what commentators have sometimes translated 
incompletely as “hide our strength and bide our time”15—explains the 
development of such notions as “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi) and 
“peace and development”16 and the focus on constructing a 
harmonious, multipolar world.17 
Nevertheless, recent years have seen China slowly moving 
toward greater engagement at both the regional and global levels.  
Some commentators even suggested that the current Chinese 
leadership has now moved away from, if not abandoned, the approach 
of “taoguang yanghui.”18  To highlight China’s changing approach 
toward international engagement, this Part focuses on three notable 
developments that have enabled China to shape future international 
intellectual property norms. 
                                                                                                               
 14 See Teng Chung-chian, Hegemony or Partnership: China’s Strategy and Diplomacy 
Toward Latin America, in CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: BEIJING’S STRATEGY FOR 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 84, 88 (Joshua Eisenman et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter CHINA 
AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD] (“[W]atch and analyze developments calmly [lengjing 
guancha]; secure our own positions [chenzhuo yingfu]; deal with change with confidence 
[wenzhu zhenjiao]; conceal our capacities [taoguang yanghui]; be good at keeping a low 
profile [shanyu shouzhuo]; never become the leader [juebu dantou].”). 
 15 The phrase taoguang yanghui “is usually translated as ‘hide our strength and bide 
our time’, but literally means ‘hide light, nurture obscurity’.” MILLER, supra note 8, at 26; 
see also Verna Yu, “China Threat” Hangs on a Phrase, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 2, 
2010, at 4 (discussing the controversy surrounding the oft-misinterpreted phrase “taoguang 
yanghui” in the context of China’s foreign policy). 
 16 Kurt M. Campbell, Foreword to CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 14, 
at ix, x. 
 17 See C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD 
NEEDS TO KNOW NOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER 129 (2006) (discussing the notion 
of a “multipolar world” that China has promoted); HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA 500 (2011) 
(discussing the notion of a “harmonious world” that China has promoted). 
 18 See Maximilian Mayer, China’s Rise as Eurasian Power: The Revival of the Silk 
Road and Its Consequences, in RETHINKING SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 1, 2 (“[A] new 
generation of leaders under President Xi Jinping has gradually abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s 
principle of ‘biding time while lying low.’”); Yu, Rise of China, supra note 11, at 436 
(“China has now been slowly moving away from Deng Xiaoping’s guidance that China 
should ‘conceal [its] capacities’ (taoguang yanghui) and ‘be good at keeping a low profile’ 
(shanyu shouzhuo).”). 
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The first development concerns the establishment of bilateral 
and regional trade agreements, which China has actively developed 
since the early 2000s.19  At the time of writing, China has established 
bilateral agreements with Chile, Pakistan, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Peru, Costa Rica, Iceland, Switzerland, South Korea, Australia, 
Georgia, and the Maldives.20  With the ten members of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China also 
established the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area.21 
Taken together, these agreements have shown not only 
China’s growing emphasis on intellectual property issues, but also its 
ability to play a more sophisticated FTA game.22  For illustrative 
purposes, the China–Singapore Free Trade Agreement does not have 
a single intellectual property provision,23 and the China–Pakistan 
Free Trade Agreement mentions the term “intellectual property” only 
twice—in relation to border measures and investment but not 
substantive protection.24  By contrast, the China–New Zealand Free 
Trade Agreement contains an intellectual property chapter of close to 
800 words.25  The size of that chapter quickly doubled to more than 
                                                                                                               
 19 See sources cited supra note 5. 
 20 Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship, supra note 1, at 1112. 
 21 See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 5, at 1007–09 (discussing the 
establishment of the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area); see also Peter K. Yu, The 
Incremental Development of the ASEAN–China Strategic Intellectual Property Partnership, 
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Christoph Antons & Michael 
Blakeney eds., forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Yu, ASEAN–China Strategic Partnership] 
(discussing the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area in the intellectual property context). The ten 
members of ASEAN are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. ASEAN Member Countries, 
ASS’N SE. ASIAN NATIONS,  
http://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/ [https://perma.cc/Z9ZP-U369] (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2016). 
 22 See Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements and China’s Global Intellectual Property 
Strategy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
REGION 247, 265 (Christoph Antons & Reto M. Hilty eds., 2015) (noting the growing 
emphasis on intellectual property issues in China’s bilateral and regional FTAs). 
 23 Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, China-Sing., Oct. 23, 2008. 
 24 See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan art. 10, China-Pak., Nov. 24, 
2006 (laying down special requirements related to border measures); id. art. 46.1(d) 
(providing the coverage of the term “investment”). 
 25 See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Government of New Zealand ch. 12, China-N.Z., Apr. 7, 2008 (providing the 
intellectual property chapter). 
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1500 words in the China–Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement26 and 
again doubled to more than 3000 words in the China–Switzerland 
Free Trade Agreement.27  The latter agreement was the first Chinese 
FTA to include a detailed intellectual property chapter with a wide 
variety of provisions.28 
The second development concerns the ongoing negotiation of 
the RCEP.  Launched in November 2012, this partnership built on 
past trade and non-trade discussions between the ten ASEAN 
members and their six major Asia-Pacific neighbors (Australia, 
China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea).29  Together, 
these sixteen countries “account for almost half of the world’s 
population, over 30 per cent of global [gross domestic product] and 
over a quarter of world exports.”30  Upon establishment, the RCEP 
will cover not only China and India, but also two high-income Asian 
economies (Japan and South Korea).  The pact will also feature six 
other countries that were involved in the negotiation of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership31 (TPP)—namely, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam.  Together with 
Japan, these six countries have now become members of the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
                                                                                                               
 26 See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica ch. 10, China-Costa Rica, Apr. 8, 
2010 (providing the intellectual property chapter). 
 27 See Free Trade Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Swiss 
Confederation ch. 11, Switz.-China, July 6, 2013, (providing the intellectual property 
chapter). 
 28 See Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 2, at 729–30 (discussing the 
expansive intellectual property chapter in the China–Switzerland Free Trade Agreement). 
 29 Id. at 675. 
 30 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE 
(Austl.), http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/pages/regional-comprehensive-economic-
partnership.aspx [https://perma.cc/7ZQX-TTMT] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019) (Austl.). 
 31 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Feb. 4, 2016,  
https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-
text [https://perma.cc/K8A3-CMW6]. For the Author’s discussions of the TPP, see generally 
Peter K. Yu, The ACTA/TPP Country Clubs, in ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE: 
21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE 
258 (Dana Beldiman ed., 2014) [hereinafter Yu, ACTA/TPP Country Clubs]; Yu, 
Crossvergence, supra note 2; Yu, Copyright Normsetting, supra note 2; Peter K. Yu, 
Thinking About the Trans-Pacific Partnership (and a Mega-Regional Agreement on Life 
Support), 20 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 97 (2017) [hereinafter Yu, Thinking About the TPP]; 
Peter K. Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1129 (2014). 
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Partnership32 (CPTPP).  Developed to replace the TPP Agreement 
following the United States’ withdrawal,33 the CPTPP was signed in 
Chile in March 2018 and has recently entered into force.34 
Although the RCEP negotiations were established not solely 
as a reactive response or a defensive measure to the TPP 
negotiations,35 the exclusion of China and other emerging countries 
in Asia from the TPP most certainly has accelerated the RCEP 
negotiations.36  From China’s standpoint, the preference for a 
                                                                                                               
 32 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Mar. 8, 
2018, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-
concluded-but-not-in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-
pacific-partnership-text [https://perma.cc/ZR93-E9DA]; see also Yu, Thinking About the 
TPP, supra note 32, at 104–06 (discussing the CPTPP); CPTPP vs TPP, N.Z. MINISTRY 
FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE,  
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/agreements-under-
negotiation/cptpp-2/tpp-and-cptpp-the-differences-explained/  
[https://perma.cc/BP5A-PQ8X] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019) (explaining the differences 
between the TPP and the CPTPP). 
 33 See Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017); 
see also Yu, Thinking About the TPP, supra note 32, at 101–10 (discussing the United States’ 
withdrawal and its aftermath). 
 34 See Ankit Panda, The CPTPP Trade Agreement Will Enter into Force, DIPLOMAT 
(Nov. 1, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/the-cptpp-trade-agreement-will-enter-into-
force-on-december-30/ [https://perma.cc/J4FJ-83GE] (reporting Australia’s ratification of 
the CPTPP). 
 35 See Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 2, at 678 (“Although the RCEP 
negotiations were launched in November 2012—more than two years after the beginning of 
the TPP negotiations—they were not established solely as a reactive response to the latter.”). 
 36 As I noted in an earlier article: 
Although the ASEAN+6 leaders’ joint declaration did not specifically 
mention the TPP, there is no denying that the development of this United 
States–led partnership has greatly accelerated the RCEP negotiations. 
The latter negotiations were particularly urgent when two major 
ASEAN+6 economies, China and India, were intentionally excluded 
from the TPP. Also excluded were other key ASEAN+6 members, such 
as Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. 
Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 2, at 681–83; see also Du Ming, Explaining 
China’s Tripartite Strategy Toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 18 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 407, 424 (2015) (“After the USA introduced the TPP and several ASEAN members 
joined the TPP negotiations, ASEAN has been concerned that the USA might take away its 
leadership of Asian economic integration and marginalize the Association. ASEAN’s 
proposal for forming the RCEP in 2012 was at least partially motivated by this concern.”); 
Shintaro Hamanaka, Trans-Pacific Partnership Versus Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting 13 (Asian Development Bank, 
Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 146, 2014), 
https://aric.adb.org/pdf/workingpaper/WP146_Hamanaka_Trans-Pacific_Partnership.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6L99-YY24] (stating that, while China’s dominant strategy “is to establish 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol14/iss3/1
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regional pact in which the country can play some leadership role is 
easy to understand.  As Shintaro Hamanaka explained: 
[T]he formation of regional integration and 
cooperation frameworks can be best understood as a 
dominant state’s attempt to create its own regional 
framework where it can exercise some exclusive 
influence. . . . For an economy that wants to increase 
its influence, establishing a regional group where it 
can be the most powerful state—dominating other 
members in terms of material capacity—is 
convenient. . . . By assuming [such] leadership, an 
economy can set a favorable agenda and establish 
convenient rules.  In addition, the most powerful state 
can increase influence through prestige and 
asymmetric economic interdependence with others.37 
Thus far, ASEAN+6 members have already entered into 
twenty-five rounds of negotiations.38  Once the RCEP negotiations 
conclude, it is anticipated that the final text will cover a wide range 
of areas, including “trade in goods, trade in services, investment, 
economic and technical cooperation, intellectual property, 
competition [and] dispute settlement.”39  Beyond these areas, 
working or sub-working groups have also been established to address 
rules of origin; customs procedures and trade facilitation; legal and 
institutional issues; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; standards, 
                                                                                                               
a regional framework that does not include the United States so it can hold a dominant 
position,” Japan seems to have been “using the ‘PRC card’ to improve its TPP negotiation 
position vis-à-vis the United States”); Michael Wesley, Who Calls the Tune? Asia Has to 
Dance to Duelling Trade Agendas, CONVERSATION (Oct. 19, 2014),  
https://theconversation.com/whocalls-the-tune-asia-has-to-dance-to-duelling-trade-
agendas-32813 [https://perma.cc/8MDH-K6KM] (“For Beijing, RCEP is a defensive 
measure against the TPP. It is calculating that the lure of the size and dynamism of the 
Chinese economy will convince the region to opt for a more ‘Asianist’ grouping, rather than 
the TPP’s Pacific model, which threatens to divide Asia’s economic regionalism.”). 
 37 Hamanaka, supra note 36, at 2 (footnote and citations omitted). 
 38 See Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: News, DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. & 
TRADE, http://dfat.gov.aultrade/agreements/rcep/news/Pages/news.aspx  
[https://perma.cc/T3XE-8LZM] (last visited July 6, 2016) (Austl.) [hereinafter RCEP News]. 
 39 ASEAN Plus Six, Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership pmbl. (Aug. 30, 2012),  
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/Documents/guiding-principles-rcep.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2AC7-EU6W] [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. 
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technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures; 
electronic commerce; financial services; and telecommunications.40 
Given this large number of working and sub-working groups, 
it remains to be seen whether their establishment will result in the 
creation of standalone chapters in each specific area.  The Guiding 
Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (Guiding Principles) did 
mention specifically “the text on intellectual property in the RCEP.”41  
Knowledge Ecology International, a nongovernmental organization 
active in the intellectual property area, also leaked an early draft of 
the RCEP intellectual property chapter.42  Although that draft was 
dated October 15, 2015 and has most certainly evolved following the 
United States’ withdrawal from the TPP and the CPTPP’s eventual 
suspension of select TPP provisions,43 it will be very unlikely for the 
RCEP negotiating parties to abandon their plan to include an 
intellectual property chapter in their agreement.44 
The last development is the most interesting yet also the most 
uncertain.45  It concerns the slowly emerging BRI, which is the focus 
of this Article.  Inspired by the Silk Road that dates back to two 
                                                                                                               
 40 See RCEP News, supra note 38 (reporting the formation of working and sub-working 
groups). 
 41 See Guiding Principles, supra note 39, pt. V (“The text on intellectual property in the 
RCEP will aim to reduce [intellectual property]–related barriers to trade and investment by 
promoting economic integration and cooperation in the utilization, protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights.”). 
 42 See 2015 Oct 15 Version: RCEP IP Chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Apr. 19, 
2016), http://keionline.org/node/2472 [https://perma.cc/4VJQ-T5NL] (providing the leaked 
October 15, 2015 text of the proposed RCEP intellectual property chapter). 
 43 Although the CPTPP kept intact a large part of the original TPP intellectual property 
chapter, it suspended the more controversial intellectual property provisions, such as those 
covering copyright and patent terms, undisclosed test or other data, biologics, technological 
protection measures, and legal remedies and safe harbours. See Yu, Thinking About the TPP, 
supra note 32, at 105 (discussing the CPTPP’s suspension of select TPP provisions). 
 44 See Peter K. Yu, The RCEP and Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property Norms, 50 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 673, 722 (2017) (“Absent any catastrophic developments in the 
RCEP negotiations, the investment in [the working group on intellectual property] is just too 
substantial for the [intellectual property] chapter to be abandoned at this late stage.”). 
 45 See Lutz-Christian Wolff & Xi Chao, Preface to LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7, 
at xvii, xvii (“Despite the fact that its tremendous significance for local, regional and global 
developments is widely acknowledged the precise scope, aims and even the participating 
countries of the intuitive are not yet clearly defined.”); see also Mayer, supra note 18, at 28 
(“[T]he question how the [BRI] can be developed into a multilateral institution raises puzzles 
that put the Chinese elites’ creativity and tenacity to a hard test.”). 
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millennia ago46 and aiming to rejuvenate the nation,47 Chinese 
President Xi Jinping announced the construction of the land-based 
Silk Road Economic Belt at Nazarbayev University in Astana, 
Kazakhstan in September 2013.48  This announcement was followed 
a month later by President Xi’s introduction of the sea-based 21st-
century Maritime Silk Road during a speech made at the Indonesian 
Parliament.49  Together, the two new “Silk Roads” have now become 
the BRI, which many commentators have considered President Xi’s 
“centrepiece of [his] ‘proactive’ foreign policy.”50  As the Chinese 
government declared in its guiding document entitled Vision and 
Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road (Vision and Actions): 
Accelerating the building of the Belt and Road can 
help promote the economic prosperity of the countries 
along the Belt and Road and regional economic 
cooperation, strengthen exchanges and mutual 
learning between different civilizations, and promote 
world peace and development.  It is a great 
undertaking that will benefit people around the 
world.51 
                                                                                                               
 46 “The ancient Silk Road started from Chang’an (now referred to as Xi’an), an ancient 
Chinese capital, which went through countries in Central Asia like Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, 
Syria to reach the Mediterranean, and ends in Rome. The road ran 6,440 km.” Zhang 
Yunling, Belt and Road Initiative as a Grand Strategy, in CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD 
INITIATIVES, supra note 8, at 3, 6. 
 47 See MILLER, supra note 8, at 33 (“There is little doubt that President Xi sees the Belt 
and Road as a practical step towards realizing the strategic goal of national 
rejuvenation . . . .”). As Tom Miller observed further: 
President Xi’s mission . . . to return China to what he regards as its 
natural, rightful and historical position as the greatest power in Asia . . . 
does not mean that China has to replace the US as the world’s only 
superpower, but it does mean that Asia has to predominate in its own 
backyard. 
Id. at 11. 
 48 WANG, supra note 8, at 22. 
 49 Id. 
 50 MILLER, supra note 8, at 30; see also id. at 12 (“[The BRI] is Xi Jinping’s signature 
policy, designed to secure his legacy.”); Mayer, supra note 18, at 2 (describing the BRI as 
“the most ambitious foreign policy approach adopted by China thus far”). 
 51 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, preface. 
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Although a growing volume of literature has now slowly 
emerged to examine this new initiative,52 especially within China,53 
it remains unclear how the initiative will affect the country and the 
world at large in the intellectual property area.  Indeed, there has not 
been much discussion of the BRI in this area.54  This lack of 
discussion is understandable, considering that the initiative has 
focused primarily on connectivity55 and infrastructural 
development.56 
                                                                                                               
 52 See sources cited supra note 8. 
 53 As Maximilian Mayer observed: 
Within China . . . , the study of the [BRI] has developed into a cottage 
industry as the Chinese government initiated a broad academic debate 
and called for input from various domestic research institutes, think 
tanks, and universities in order to articulate a comprehensive policy 
based on Xi’s earlier remarks. Over one hundred institutes have formed 
a special [BRI] think tank alliance. The massive increase in official 
funding began to impact the entire research landscape of Chinese 
academia. 
Mayer, supra note 18, at 3 (footnote omitted). Professor Wang contrasted the different 
receptions of the BRI within and outside China: 
Two years after its launch, B&R [Belt and Road] is beset with symptoms 
of being “hot inside and cold outside”. Within the context of China, the 
inland provinces located along the B&R consider the B&R a massive 
opportunity for economic development. However, reactions are mixed 
in relation to the countries along the B&R. 
Wang, supra note 8, at 96. But see Mayer, supra note 18, at 9 (“The [BRI] is, arguably, the 
first Chinese concept that has a lasting impact on international discourses.”). 
 54 See generally Lee, supra note 7 (discussing the BRI in the intellectual property 
context). 
 55 See Nivedita Das Kundu, Introduction to CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD, supra note 
8, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Kundu, Introduction] (stating that the BRI “can . . . be considered as a 
transnational connectivity model, as it aims to coordinate factors of economic circulation 
across different national spaces, with different governance models, legal norms and political 
contingencies”); Zhang, supra note 46, at 7 (“Connectivity are pillars of the Belt and Road 
strategy.”). 
 56 As the Chinese government declared in Vision and Actions: 
Facilities connectivity is a priority area for implementing the Initiative. 
On the basis of respecting each other’s sovereignty and security 
concerns, countries along the Belt and Road should improve the 
connectivity of their infrastructure construction plans and technical 
standard systems, jointly push forward the construction of international 
trunk passageways, and form an infrastructure network connecting all 
sub-regions in Asia, and between Asia, Europe and Africa step by step. 
At the same time, efforts should be made to promote green and low-
carbon infrastructure construction and operation management, taking 
into full account the impact of climate change on the construction. 
VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. IV; see also Alexander Demissie, Special Economic 
Zones: Integrating African Countries in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, in RETHINKING 
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Nevertheless, the past few years have seen growing 
developments in the intellectual property area.  In July 2016, the 
Chinese government co-organized with the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) a two-day High Level Conference on 
Intellectual Property for Countries Along the “Belt and Road” in 
Beijing.57  At that conference, State Councilor Wang Yong called on 
countries to “work together to prioritize IP [intellectual property] as 
a system to promote innovation and to share the benefits of 
innovation.”58  He further noted that the BRI could provide assistance 
in four areas: “cooperation in IP-related services, harmonization of IP 
rules, inter-operability of databases, and joint human resources 
training.”59 
In May 2017, China adopted the Agreement on Enhancing 
“Belt and Road” Intellectual Property Cooperation with WIPO.60  
The country also “signed memorandums of understanding on IP 
cooperation with a large number of countries including Tajikistan, 
Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, Armenia, Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Egypt.”61  In addition, China “carried out extensive cooperation with 
[Belt and Road] countries in terms of IP education, publicity, training 
and information exchange.”62  In August 2018, a second High Level 
Conference on Intellectual Property for Countries Along the “Belt 
                                                                                                               
SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 69, 73–76 (discussing infrastructural development as a catalyst 
for industrialization and development); Li Xing, China’s Pursuit of the “One Belt One 
Road” Initiative: A New World Order with Chinese Characteristics?, in MAPPING CHINA’S 
OBOR INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 1, 14 [hereinafter Li, China’s Pursuit] (“Infrastructure 
construction has become the ‘Chinese solution’ in promoting regional economic 
integration.”). 
 57 Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. Org., High Level “Belt and Road” 
Conference Urges Closer IP Collaboration for Economic Growth (July 27, 2016), 
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/offices/china/news/2016/news_0008.html 
[https://perma.cc/VS2C-Q9R7] [hereinafter Belt and Road Conference Release]. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Press Release, WIPO Director General Visits Belt and Road Forum and China 
Supreme People’s Court (May 18, 2017),  
https://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/offices/china/news/2017/news_0001.html 
[https://perma.cc/LB9R-EC6R]. 
 61 Li You, Intellectual Property in Focus at High-Level Forum in Beijing, CHINA DAILY 
(Aug. 29, 2018), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2018-08/29/content_36837702.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WUR5-N7RD] [hereinafter Li, Intellectual Property in Focus]. 
 62 Id. 
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and Road” was held in Beijing.63  The event emphasized the BRI’s 
importance in the intellectual property area while exploring its many 
promises and challenges.64 
When the developments surrounding China’s FTAs, the 
RCEP, and the BRI are taken together, they show the country’s 
increasing eagerness to assert itself in the international arena, 
including in matters involving intellectual property protection and 
enforcement.  It will be too early to evaluate the full impact of this 
new approach toward international engagement, but the changing 
approach has certainly raised a number of interesting questions: Will 
this approach result in greater convergence or divergence of 
international and regional intellectual property norms?65  Will the 
approach intensify the ongoing rivalry between intellectual property 
norm setters in Asia?66  What impact will this approach has on the 
international intellectual property regime and the global 
community?67 
II.     Belt and Road Initiative 
Shortly after the BRI’s announcement, policymakers and 
commentators began to wonder about the initiative’s motives, logic, 
                                                                                                               
 63 Press Release, Nat’l Intellectual Prop. Admin. of China, The 2018 High-Level 
Conference on IP for Countries Along Belt and Road Highlights Inclusiveness, 
Development, Cooperation, Mutual Benefit (Aug. 29, 2018),  
http://english.cnipa.gov.cn/specialtopic/tbar2018/tbar2018headlines/1131331.htm 
[https://perma.cc/N5MA-6NRS]. 
 64 Press Release, Nat’l Intellectual Prop. Admin. of China, 2018 High-level Conference 
on Intellectual Property for Countries Along the Belt and Road Approaching (Aug. 27, 
2018),  
http://english.cnipa.gov.cn/specialtopic/tbar2018/tbar2018prb/1131291.htm 
[https://perma.cc/KH7J-FBYZ] (stating that the conference “aim[ed] to exchange views on 
the new situation of international IP development at present, discuss IP problems confronting 
countries along the Belt and Road, and explore the vision of cooperation in the future”). 
 65 See generally Yu, Crossvergence, supra note 2, at 278 (arguing that the RCEP 
negotiations will result in neither convergence nor divergence, but “crossvergence,” of 
regional intellectual property norms). 
 66 See generally Yu, Asian Norm Setters, supra note 2 (discussing the rivalry between 
Asian intellectual property norm setters); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Battle 
to Define Asia’s Intellectual Property Law: From TPP to RCEP, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 331 
(2018) (discussing the struggle between key RCEP negotiating parties over intellectual 
property rules). 
 67 See generally Yu, Copyright Normsetting, supra note 2, at 42–45 (discussing the 
battle between the TPP, the CPTPP, and the RCEP); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 
5, at 1018–27 (discussing “the battle of the FTAs”). 
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ramifications, and geographical reach.68  Some even compared the 
BRI to the Chinese “Marshall Plan,” bringing to mind the United 
States–led reconstruction effort in Europe following the end of the 
Second World War.69  It was not until the Chinese government’s 
release of Vision and Actions that analysis of the BRI began to 
concretize.70  Even now, commentators remain deeply divided over 
the initiative’s overall benefits, potential drawbacks, and future 
impacts. 
This Part does not aim to unravel the motive or logic behind 
the BRI.  Nor does it seek to predict what this initiative will 
eventually become.  In fact, this Article is comfortable with the 
possibility that we may never be able to pinpoint the initiative’s 
trajectory.71  After all, the BRI remains a moving target, taking on 
                                                                                                               
 68 “The 65 countries along the Belt and Road account for 63 percent of the total 
population of the world, but their output only makes up 29 percent of the world’s total.” 
WANG, supra note 8, at 4; see Lutz-Christian Wolff, China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative—
An Introduction, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7, at 1, 7 [hereinafter Wolff, 
Introduction] (“It now seems to be commonly accepted that in addition to China there are 
altogether 64 B&R countries.”); see also id. at 8–19 (providing information about the BRI 
countries); WANG, supra note 8, at 76–77 (providing a classification of the 64 countries 
involved in the BRI). 
 69 See Li, China’s Pursuit, supra note 56, at 13 (discussing how the BRI has been 
“driven by a number of political, economic and security-related logics similar to those upon 
which the Marshall Plan was initiated”); WANG, supra note 8, at 39–44 (explaining how the 
BRI, “while not being a Chinese Marshall Plan, has gone beyond the level of the Marshall 
Plan”); Yang Minghong, Understanding the One Belt One Road Initiative: China’s 
Perspective, in CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD, supra note 8, at 7, 10–13 (discussing whether 
the BRI is the Chinese version of the Marshall Plan); see also David J. Lynch, World Bank 
Touts Global Stimulus Plan, USA TODAY, Feb. 10, 2009, at 4B (reporting Justin Lin’s call 
for the establishment of a “global recovery fund in the spirit of the Marshall Plan” when he 
was the World Bank’s chief economist). But see Tim Summers, Rocking the Boat? China’s 
“Belt and Road” and Global Order, in CHINA’S PRESENCE IN MIDDLE EAST, supra note 8, at 
24, 33 (“[N]umerous Chinese scholars have sought to rebut analysis that compares the belt 
and road initiative with the post-war Marshall Plan for Europe as [a] way of cementing 
China’s geopolitical influence.” (footnote omitted)); see also Mayer, supra note 18, at 7 
(noting that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi “dismiss[ed] a comparison between the 
[BRI] and the U.S. Marshall Plan”). 
 70 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9. 
 71 Commentators have identified multiple reasons behind the BRI’s potential success. 
Professor Mayer provided four reasons: 
First, the proposal was advanced by president Xi, the strongest leader of 
the Chinese Communist Party . . . since Deng Xiaoping. Xi has 
sufficient political capital and bureaucratic strength to substantially 
carry out the initiative that also became enshrined in the 13th Five-Year 
Plan. Second, the uptake in many other countries is much stronger than 
anticipated. China’s economic vision to improve Eurasian connectivity 
resonates with many, especially against the background of anti-
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new values, meanings, and contents as policymakers develop new 
ways to implement this initiative.  To some extent, the BRI’s lack of 
concrete policy formulation has been a blessing in disguise.  For an 
area such as intellectual property, having a mostly blank canvas can 
be highly appealing. 
To enhance our understanding of the BRI, this Part focuses on 
five distinct areas of inquiry: (1) the nature of this initiative; (2) its 
core objectives; (3) its potential disruption to existing multilateral and 
regional institutions; (4) its overall inclusiveness; and (5) the various 
responses it will elicit.  Greater inquiry in these five areas will shed 
light on not only the BRI’s ongoing status, but also its future 
evolution. 
The first inquiry concerns the nature of the BRI.  Initially, 
commentators debated whether this initiative is a vision,72 a catchy 
slogan,73 an experiment,74 or a “grand strategy.”75  By now, it is quite 
                                                                                                               
globalization agenda of the Trump administration. . . .Third, a failure of 
this ambitious project would severely weaken China’s soft power and 
jeopardize its global leadership claim. The Chinese leaders, thus, have a 
powerful incentive to keep the [BRI] working at almost any cost. 
Finally, and most importantly, the government has articulated a 
convincing domestic rational[e] for the [BRI] . . . which keeps in check 
internal critical voices that question the risky use of taxpayer money 
abroad. 
Mayer, supra note 18, at 8–9 (footnotes omitted). 
 72 See Niv Horesh, Introduction: China’s One Belt, One Road Vision—Implications for 
the Middle East, in CHINA’S PRESENCE IN MIDDLE EAST, supra note 8, at 1, 1 (referring to 
the “One Belt, One Road vision”); Wolff, Introduction, supra note 68, at 4 (“B&R has . . . 
been referred to as ‘a vision’ and ‘little more than a buzz word’.”). 
 73 See Horesh, supra note 72, at 1 (“Others have concluded that B&R is ‘far more than 
a slogan’, but still ‘a small phrase with big ambitions.’” (footnote omitted)); Mayer, supra 
note 18, at 8 (“[O]bservers call into question the strategic maturity of the Belt and Road 
because it could be seen as yet another in a series of political slogans (zhengzhi kouhao) over 
the last two decades.”). 
 74 See Mayer, supra note 18, at 11 (“[The BRI] can be seen as an ‘experimental’ 
approach that tests how to connect domestic with international economic processes to 
guarantee China’s continued growth.” (footnote omitted)). 
 75 See id. at 2 (“[T]he idea of engineering a revival of the ancient Silk Road marks a 
turning point in the debates about China’s strategy.”); WANG, supra note 8, at 20 (“[T]he 
Belt and Road Initiative is not just a path option to realize the Chinese Dream, but also a 
strategic plan to enhance a rising power’s voice . . . .”); Zhang, supra note 46, at 6–8 
(discussing the BRI as a “grand strategy”). But see Kundu, Introduction, supra note 55, at 2 
(“The thinking behind the ‘Belt’ and ‘Road’ strategy as defined by Chinese government is 
an ‘initiative’ and not as a ‘plan’ or ‘strategy’.”); MILLER, supra note 8, at 30 (“Beijing is 
adamant that [the BRI] should not be called a ‘plan’ or a ‘strategy’, lest it be interpreted as 
a ruse to build a vast economic empire.”); Yang, supra note 69, at 7 (“The use of the word 
‘strategy’ suggests that China wants to pursue the benefits of the Belt and Road Initiative 
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clear that the BRI is an initiative, as its name suggests.  As the 
Chinese government stated in Vision and Actions, this initiative is “a 
systematic project” seeking to “integrate the development strategies 
of the countries along the Belt and Road.”76  To complicate matters, 
the initiative, like the Silk Road that provided its inspiration, will 
likely evolve over a long period of time.77  As Wang Yiwei, the author 
of a highly comprehensive monograph on the BRI, recounted the 
gradual and sprawling development of the ancient maritime Silk 
Road: 
The history of the ancient maritime Silk Road can . . . 
be dated back to more than 2,000 years, when people 
in the Han Dynasty opened the maritime route to India 
through Southeast Asia.  The Tang Dynasty (618–
907) turned the focus of foreign trade from the land 
route to the sea route.  The Song Dynasty (960–1279) 
and Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) encouraged Arabian 
businessmen to trade in cities such as Guangzhou and 
Quanzhou, so that coverage has been expanded to the 
Persian Gulf and the coastal areas of Arabia through 
the Indian Ocean, rather than just to South India 
through Southeast Asia.  The Ming Dynasty (1368–
1644) opened a route for trade using sailing vessels 
starting from Manila to Mexico’s Acapulco, through 
which Chinese silk and silk products carried to Manila 
by Chinese commercial ships were shipped across the 
Pacific Ocean to the American Continent, and then to 
European countries across the Atlantic Ocean.78 
                                                                                                               
exclusively from the perspective of its own national interests and it is even a game strategy 
targeting certain countries.”). 
 76 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, preface; see also Kundu, Introduction, supra note 
55, at 1, 2 (“The debate on the [BRI] by China focuses on and anticipates possible policy 
convergence between China and other Sovereign national governments along the road.”). 
 77 See Yang, supra note 69, at 13 (noting the view of a senior adviser to the United 
States Energy Security Council that “the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative is not a temporary plan, 
but will involve one and more generations and can even go beyond the century”). 
 78 WANG, supra note 8, at 31; see also Anastas Vangeli, A Framework for the Study of 
the One Belt One Road Initiative as a Medium of Principle Diffusion, in MAPPING CHINA’S 
OBOR INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 57, 61 (“The [BRI] is a concept ‘with Chinese 
characteristics’, meaning that it is being developed incrementally, and with a long-term 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
292 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 14 
 
The second inquiry pertains to the BRI’s core objectives.  The 
Chinese government’s guiding document explicitly identified a 
number of priority objectives: 
The Belt and Road Initiative aims to promote the 
connectivity of Asian, European and African 
continents and their adjacent seas, establish and 
strengthen partnerships among the countries along the 
Belt and Road, set up all-dimensional, multi-tiered 
and composite connectivity networks, and realize 
diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable 
development in these countries.  The connectivity 
projects of the Initiative will help align and coordinate 
the development strategies of the countries along the 
Belt and Road, tap market potential in this region, 
promote investment and consumption, create demands 
and job opportunities, enhance people-to-people and 
cultural exchanges, and mutual learning among the 
peoples of the relevant countries, and enable them to 
understand, trust and respect each other and live in 
harmony, peace and prosperity.79 
The document further called on countries along the Belt and 
Road to “promote policy coordination, facilities connectivity, 
unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds as 
their five major goals.”80  In addition to these five goals, close 
observers of the BRI have identified additional objectives to the 
benefit of China, the initiative’s initiator: 
• respond to global economic crisis;81 
• facilitate opening-up;82 
                                                                                                               
outlook, and it is a concept that demonstrates the converse between different foreign policy 
initiatives and China’s domestic development.”). 
 79 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. I. 
 80 Id. pt. IV; see also WANG, supra note 8, at 168–74 (discussing these five goals). 
 81 See WANG, supra note 8, at 26 (discussing the BRI as “a way for global economic 
growth in the post-financial crisis era”). 
 82 See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, at pt. I (“China will stay committed to the 
basic policy of opening-up, build a new pattern of all-round opening-up, and integrate itself 
deeper into the world economic system.”); Wan Ziqiang & Li Shanmin, National Economic 
Security and the “Belt and Road” Initiative, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7, at 261, 
267 (“The B&R is . . . an important platform to jumpstart a new round of reforms and 
opening up.”); WANG, supra note 8, at 3 (“The Belt and Road construction has shaped 
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• provide a new source of economic growth;83 
• reduce excess production capacity;84 
• promote outbound investment;85 
• foster development of central and western provinces;86 
• improve the country’s global competitiveness;87 
                                                                                                               
China’s new strategic pattern of all-round opening-up . . . .”); Yang, supra note 69, at 8 
(“Internally, the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative is a new strategy that China adopts to further 
promote opening up.”). 
 83 As Tom Miller explained: 
Beijing’s great hope is that state commodity producers, engineering 
firms and capital good makers will find a lucrative new market of 
growth. The Belt and Road will require billions of tonnes of steel and 
cement, hundreds of thousands of workers, thousands of cranes and 
diggers, and dozens of new dams, power stations, and electricity grids. 
MILLER, supra note 8, at 31–32. 
 84 See id. at 32 (“Beijing views the [BRI] as a lifeline for indebted firms suffering from 
weak demand at home and looking to export their overcapacity.”); Li, China’s Pursuit, supra 
note 56, at 8 (“The ultimate goal of the [BRI] is often interpreted as a way to redirect the 
country’s domestic overcapacity and capital for regional infrastructure development in order 
to . . . continue to keep Chinese industry and production robust, and . . . to maintain a low 
unemployment rate through retaining an acceptable GDP growth rate.”); Yang, supra note 
69, at 14–15 (exploring whether the BRI will help China transfer excess capacity). But see 
MILLER, supra note 8, at 49–50 (questioning the potential of the BRI to “absorb China’s 
industrial overcapacity”). 
 85 See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, at pt. IV (“We . . . encourage Chinese 
enterprises to participate in infrastructure construction in other countries along the Belt and 
Road, and make industrial investments there.”); Mayer, supra note 18, at 10 (“China’s own 
economy that is increasingly slowing down would benefit from massive infrastructure 
construction projects and outward foreign direct investments, pushing forward structural 
adjustment, economic reforms, industrial upgrading, and regional development within 
China.”); MILLER, supra note 8, at 32 (“[The BRI] is China’s second big overseas investment 
push, following the ‘Go Out’ policy launched by Jiang Zemin in 1999.”); WANG, supra note 
8, at 16 (“In terms of the essence of opening-up the strategy has gradually been turned from 
‘bringing in’ to ‘going global,’ and the integration of these two strategies has been 
deepened.”). For discussions of the BRI in relation to outbound investment, see generally 
Vivienne Bath, “One Belt, One Road” and Chinese Investment, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, 
supra note 7, at 165; Henry Ningning Huang & Terri Chenyue Tian, “One Belt, One Road” 
and China’s Outbound Investment Regime, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7, at 139. 
 86 See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, preface (noting the need to “create strategic 
propellers for hinterland development”); Mayer, supra note 18, at 12 (“The economic 
conditions in Central and Western provinces are another major concern in the Chinese 
capital.”); Andrew Scobell, Why the Middle East Matters to China, in CHINA’S PRESENCE IN 
MIDDLE EAST, supra note 8, at 9, 18–19 (discussing the BRI as a policy to rebalance internal 
economic development). 
 87 See Wan & Li, supra note 82, at 267 (“The B&R is a major strategic initiative for 
China, as it strives to gain long-term international and comparative advantages.”); WANG, 
supra note 8, at 18 (discussing how the BRI will improve China’s competitiveness by 
enhancing its comparative advantage). 
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• internationalize renminbi, the Chinese currency;88 
• divert trade;89 
• enable strategic cooperation;90 
• alleviate concerns from neighbors;91 
• launch the “charm offensive”;92 and 
                                                                                                               
 88 See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, at pt. IV (“We will support the efforts of 
governments of the countries along the Belt and Road and their companies and financial 
institutions with good credit-rating to issue Renminbi bonds in China.”); Mayer, supra note 
18, at 13 (noting as a domestic driver “the internationalization of the Renminbi”); Yuan 
Feng, The One Belt One Road Initiative and China’s Multilayered Multilateralism, in 
MAPPING CHINA’S OBOR INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 91, 96 (considering the 
“[i]nternationalization of the Chinese currency” as a goal of the BRI). See generally Chen 
Weitseng, Size Matters? Renminbi Internationalization and the Beijing Consensus, in THE 
BEIJING CONSENSUS? HOW CHINA HAS CHANGED WESTERN IDEAS OF LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 144 (Chen Weitseng ed., 2017) (discussing China’s efforts to internationalize 
renminbi); Shen Wei, The “One Belt, One Road” Initiative, the Renminbi 
Internationalisation Strategy and Neo-global Financial Governance, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, 
supra note 7, at 305 (discussing the BRI as a renminbi internationalization strategy). 
 89 See Li, China’s Pursuit, supra note 56, at 8 (“Externally, the goal [of the BRI] is to 
continue to pave the way for the transmission of Chinese goods and services to new markets 
and to improve trade and other relations with Southeast Asia, Central Asia and the European 
countries.”); MILLER, supra note 8, at 31 (noting that the BRI enables China to “diversify 
energy supplies”); Yuan, supra note 88, at 97 (considering as a goal of the BRI to provide a 
“[g]uarantee of China’s energy supply”). See generally Gonzalo Villalta Puig, Unimpeded 
Trade? The Significance of Free Trade Areas to the Belt and Road Initiative of the People’s 
Republic of China, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7, at 103, 107 (discussing the BRI in 
the context of stated goal of “unimpeded trade”). 
 90 See WANG, supra note 8, at 57–64, 71–77 (discussing the opportunities for regional 
cooperation and global development). 
 91 See MILLER, supra note 8, at 33 (noting that the BRI “lays out a strategic vision for 
turning China into the primary global engine of economic development, rooted in the 
understanding that China’s security interests are best served by tying other countries into 
ever closer trade and investment relationships”). For discussions of the so-called China 
threat, see generally CHINA’S FUTURE: CONSTRUCTIVE PARTNER OR EMERGING THREAT (Ted 
Galen Carpenter & James A. Dorn eds., 2000); BILL GERTZ, THE CHINA THREAT: HOW THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC TARGETS AMERICA (2000); STEVEN M. MOSHER, HEGEMON: CHINA’S 
PLAN TO DOMINATE ASIA AND THE WORLD (2000); PETER NAVARRO, THE COMING CHINA 
WARS: WHERE THEY WILL BE FOUGHT AND HOW THEY CAN BE WON (2007); PETER 
NAVARRO & GREG AUTRY, DEATH BY CHINA: CONFRONTING THE DRAGON—A GLOBAL CALL 
TO ACTION (2015). 
 92 See generally JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, CHARM OFFENSIVE: HOW CHINA’S SOFT POWER 
IS TRANSFORMING THE WORLD (2007) (advancing the “charm offensive” thesis); see also 
THOMAS LUM ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34310, CHINA’S “SOFT POWER” IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA (2008) (discussing China’s growing use of soft power in Southeast Asia). 
But see Dragan Pavlićević, A Power Shift Underway in Europe? China’s Relationship with 
Central and Eastern Europe Under the Belt and Road Initiative, in MAPPING CHINA’S OBOR 
INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 249, 264–66 (discussing China’s lack of soft power capabilities 
in Asia). 
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• consolidate regional leadership.93 
Although we may never know for sure which of the abovementioned 
objectives are the key foci of those leaders and policymakers driving 
the BRI, the existence of these myriad objectives does suggest that 
this initiative will develop in multiple directions in the future and will 
involve many different countries and cultures at the same time.94 
The third inquiry relates to the ongoing and future 
participation of the BRI.  As the Chinese government stated clearly 
in Vision and Actions: 
The Initiative is open for cooperation.  It covers, but 
is not limited to, the area of the ancient Silk Road.  It 
is open to all countries, and international and regional 
organizations for engagement, so that the results of the 
concerted efforts will benefit wider areas. 
The Initiative is harmonious and inclusive.  It 
advocates tolerance among civilizations, respects the 
paths and modes of development chosen by different 
countries, and supports dialogues among different 
civilizations on the principles of seeking common 
ground while shelving differences and drawing on 
each other’s strengths, so that all countries can coexist 
in peace for common prosperity.95 
                                                                                                               
 93 See Development Finance in Asia: U.S. Economic Strategy amid China’s Belt and 
Road: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific of the H. Comm. on Foreign 
Affairs, 115th Cong. 22 (2017) (statement of Roy Kamphausen, Senior Vice President for 
Research, The National Bureau of Asian Research) (“[The BRI] is an instrument to 
consolidate China’s position at the heart of Eurasia, in a space where U.S. influence is rather 
limited. The initiative is intended to counter what Beijing perceives as the U.S.’s 
unacceptable containment of China off of its eastern seaboard.”); MILLER, supra note 8, at 
31 (“China wants to create a network of economic dependency that will considerate its 
regional leadership, enable it to hedge against the United States’ alliance structure in Asia, 
and diversify energy supplies.”). 
 94 See WANG, supra note 8, at 43 (noting that the BRI “embodies the ‘many to many’ 
cooperation model among countries along the Belt and Road”). 
 95 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. II. Offering the Chinese perspective, Professor 
Wang concurred: 
The Belt and Road Initiative stresses that China will never engage in 
unilateralism, nor will it impose its will on others. The initiative 
welcomes countries along the routes to directly and clearly state their 
development advantages and needs, and supports these countries’ efforts 
to enhance their capability for independent innovation, and achieve 
different cooperation through frank communication. Despite the fact that 
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The document mentioned three times the “Silk Road Spirit,” which is 
the shorthand for “peace and cooperation, openness and 
inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit.”96  To a large 
extent, the BRI provides a sharp contrast to the club-based exclusive 
approach taken by the negotiators of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement97 (ACTA), the TPP, and the CPTPP.98  Compared to the 
negotiations of these three instruments, the BRI’s inclusiveness is 
likely to be quite similar to that of the RCEP.99  Principle 6 of the 
Guiding Principles stated that “[t]he RCEP agreement will . . . have 
an open accession clause to enable the participation of any ASEAN 
FTA partner that did not participate in the RCEP negotiations and any 
other external economic partners after the completion of the RCEP 
negotiations.”100 
The fourth inquiry concerns the BRI’s impact at the 
multilateral and regional levels.  Thus far, a key concern about the 
                                                                                                               
the intuitive was proposed by China, during the construction process, 
China can still choose not to take the leadership, and uphold consultation 
on an equal footing so as to guarantee the rationality and feasibility of 
related programs. 
WANG, supra note 8, at 140–41; see also id. at 179 (“To carry the spirit of the Silk Road, 
there should be respect for the development options of other cultures and countries.”); Jian 
Junbo, Africa in the Maritime Silk Road: Challenges and Prospects, in RETHINKING SILK 
ROAD, supra note 8, at 99, 111 (“Beijing should insist on a ‘dialogue of civilizations’ with 
African countries, in lieu of a ‘clash of civilizations.’”); Yang, supra note 69, at 17 (“[T]o 
jointly build the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese government abandoned the idea that the 
coordination means you accept China’s plan or vice versa and stresses finding common 
grounds and cooperation fields on the basis of mutual respect and then jointly make plans.”). 
 96 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, preface. 
 97 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 
243 (2011) [hereinafter ACTA]. For the Author’s discussions of the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement, see generally Peter K. Yu, The ACTA Committee, in THE PLURILATERAL 
ENFORCEMENT AGENDA: THE GENESIS AND AFTERMATH OF ACTA 142 (Pedro Roffe & 
Xavier Seuba eds., 2014); Yu, ACTA/TPP Country Clubs, supra note 31; Peter K. Yu, ACTA 
and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1 (2011); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What 
Enforcement?, 52 IDEA 239 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, What Enforcement?]; Peter K. Yu, Six 
Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975 (2011). 
 98 For discussions of this approach, see generally Daniel Gervais, Country Clubs, 
Empiricism, Blogs and Innovation: The Future of International Intellectual Property Norm 
Making in the Wake of ACTA, in TRADE GOVERNANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE: WORLD TRADE 
FORUM 323 (Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier eds., 2012); Yu, ACTA/TPP Country Clubs, supra 
note 31. 
 99 See Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative—
Mapping the World’s Normative and Strategic Implications, 52 J. WORLD TRADE 163, 185 
(2018) (stating that the BRI may eventually grow into “an open [legal] framework or forum, 
and therefore . . . a different creature from today’s FTAs”). 
 100 Guiding Principles, supra note 39, Principle 6. 
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initiative is its potential disruption to the existing multilateral and 
regional regulatory systems,101 including those involving WIPO and 
the WTO.102  Although the Chinese government’s guiding document 
stated clearly that the initiative “will abide by . . . international 
norms”103 and will rely on the success of the existing multilateral 
                                                                                                               
 101 See Huang Yunsong, China–India in the Context of One Belt One Road: Divergences 
and Concerns, in CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD, supra note 8, at 27, 28 (“It is . . . quite 
necessary to examine at macro-level on [the BRI’s] possible impact upon the existing world 
order . . . .”); Mayer, supra note 18, at 17–21 (discussing the “[g]eoeconomic and 
[i]nstitutional [r]egional [t]ransformation” brought about by the BRI); Summers, supra note 
69 (exploring whether the RBI would challenge the existing global order); Wang Chuanxing, 
Changing International System Structures and the Belt and Road Initiative, in RETHINKING 
SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 269, 275–78 [hereinafter Wang, Changing International System 
Structures] (discussing the complexities of the BRI’s impact on international system 
structures). 
 102 See Puig, supra note 89, at 107 (“While [China] should work with Belt and Road 
Initiative participant customs territories in an attempt to advance multilateral trade 
negotiations through the WTO, [the country] should, nevertheless, accept that the WTO no 
longer functions as an effective forum for trade liberalisation.”); Yang, supra note 69, at 25 
(noting that the BRI “will not replace nor could replace the practicing international trade 
rules”). 
 103 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. II. The Chinese government’s guiding 
document further stated: 
The Belt and Road Initiative is in line with the purposes and principles 
of the UN Charter. It upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence: mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each 
other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful 
coexistence. 
Id. As two commentators observed: 
According to most Chinese scholars’ view, in the process of converting 
ideas into action, MSR [the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road] needs to 
be guided, promoted, and safeguarded by international law. In turn, 
some argue that to eventually build the MSR greatly depends on the 
ability of China to shape, formulate, and implement cooperation based 
on international law. Therefore, China should carefully study the 
international law relevant to MSR in order to resolve the actual 
challenges of “maritime connectivity.” 
Zhang Guobin & Long Yu, Connectivity and International Law in the 21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road, in RETHINKING SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 57, 58; see also Björn Ahl, China’s 
New Global Presence and Its Position Towards Public International Law: Obeying, Using 
or Shaping?, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7, at 481 (discussing the compliance with 
public international law and human rights treaties in the BRI context); Lee Jaemin, The Belt 
and Road Initiative Under Existing Trade Agreements: Some Food for Thought on a New 
Regional Integration Scheme, in INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 59 
(discussing ways to implement the BRI in a manner consistent with China’s obligations 
under existing international trade and investment agreements); Wang Heng, China’s 
Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L. 29 (2019) (outlining the 
approach China has taken to establish the BRI). 
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regulatory system,104 the recent development of the RCEP, the New 
Development Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
suggests that the BRI could complicate, if not undermine, those 
existing multilateral and regional institutions that the United States 
and Europe helped create and from which they benefit.105  The 
analysis will become even more complicated when one takes into 
account the statement in Vision and Actions that the BRI “is a positive 
endeavor to seek new models of international cooperation and global 
governance.”106  Even if the BRI does not disrupt existing multilateral 
and regional institutions, it could alter or supplement them.107  The 
                                                                                                               
 104 See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. I (“The initiative to jointly build the Belt 
and Road . . . is designed to uphold the global free trade regime and the open world economy 
in the spirit of open regional cooperation.”); id. pt. V (“We should enhance the role of 
multilateral cooperation mechanisms, make full use of existing mechanisms . . . to 
strengthen communication with relevant countries, and attract more countries and regions to 
participate in the Belt and Road Initiative.”); see also Shi Jingxia, The Belt and Road 
Initiative and International Law: An International Public Goods Perspective, in 
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 9, 30 (“Whatever the international legal 
mechanisms chosen to safeguard BRI implementation, it should be emphasized that China 
does not intend the BRI to replace the existing mechanisms and institutions of regional and 
international cooperation”). One commentator observed: 
[The BRI] relies on the existing multi-lateral mechanism between China 
and relevant countries and borrows the existing and effective regional 
cooperation platforms with the aim of holding high the banner of 
peaceful development, proactively developing economic and 
cooperative partnership with countries along the road reviving the 
ancient silk road, cooperatively building the communities of common 
interests, common destiny and common responsibilities featuring 
political mutual trust, economic integration and cultural tolerance. 
Yang, supra note 69, at 8. 
 105 See MILLER, supra note 8, at 37 (noting Washington’s fear that China “was trying to 
provide an alternative to the US-dominated system of global development finance, enshrined 
at Bretton Woods, which could reshape the economic architecture of Asia”); SHAMBAUGH, 
supra note 10, at 162–63 (“Through [the BRI], China is meticulously constructing an 
alternative and parallel global institutional architecture to the postwar western order.”); see 
also Mayer, supra note 18, at 4 (“Though the new funding mechanisms and institutions 
established by China fall short of challenging the principles and practices underpinning the 
Bretton Woods system, China has gained more influence, especially in the Eurasian regional 
financial order.”). 
 106 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. I; see also Mayer, supra note 18, at 5 (“[T]he 
ambitions of the [BRI] coupled with a ‘new model of international relations’ promoted by 
Beijing are a strong signal that China is no longer a status quo power and has begun to 
actively rebuild the world order.”); WANG, supra note 8, at 27–28 (discussing the BRI as a 
way to “[c]reate a new model for regional cooperation in the 21st century”). 
 107 See MILLER, supra note 8, at 12 (noting that Beijing’s willingness to support the BRI 
with new financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk 
Road Fund “does not mean that China is rejecting the global architecture, . . . [b]ut it does 
mean that [Beijing] wants to supplement and reshape [that architecture]”); Wang, Changing 
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more disruption this initiative will cause, the more tensions and 
conflicts will ensue. 
The final inquiry involves the responses that the BRI will 
elicit from other countries, both along and away from the Belt and 
Road.  To a large extent, the initiative has greatly intensified the 
rivalry between China and other major powers in the Asia-Pacific 
region and along the Belt and Road.  Given this escalating rivalry, it 
remains to be seen how these powers will respond to the growing 
effort on the part of China and its neighbors to develop the BRI.108  
While the Trump administration has steered the United States away 
from the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia,”109 active 
development along the Belt and Road will certainly raise questions 
about the changing power structure within the region or the global 
community.110  Viewed as a zero-sum game,111 the initiative’s 
success could also undermine the efforts of other major powers in the 
                                                                                                               
International System Structures, supra note 101, at 277 (discussing China’s effort “to 
establish supplementary international institutions”); Yang, supra note 69, at 25 (noting that 
the BRI “is only a supplement and improvement to the current international economic and 
financial order”). 
 108 Cf. MILLER, supra note 8, at 240 (“Beijing hopes the incentive of massive 
infrastructure investment will persuade Asian countries to put these economic interests 
above security concerns.”). 
 109 See generally KURT M. CAMPBELL, THE PIVOT: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN 
STATECRAFT IN ASIA (2016) (discussing the Obama Administration’s “pivot to Asia”). 
 110 A key impact of the BRI is its ability to “shift the center of geopolitical gravity away 
from the U.S. and back to Eurasia.” WANG, supra note 8, at 68; see also id. at 65–70 
(discussing the opportunity for Europe to change the world); Mayer, supra note 18, at 27 
(“China’s great power identity and consequently its rhetoric and policies will increasingly 
oscillate between a Pacific (Sino-U.S. axis) and a Eurasian (Sino-Russian axis) 
orientation.”); Wolfgang Röhr, Berlin Looking Eastward: German Views of and 
Expectations from the New Silk Road, in RETHINKING SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 227, 234 
(“Perhaps the most exciting and difficult question for Germany is whether the ultimate prize 
coveted by the Silk Road initiative is not Asia or Africa, but Europe”). 
 111 A good example of the zero-sum game mentality is President Obama’s declaration 
at the conclusion of the TPP negotiations in Atlanta in October 2015: “When more than 95 
percent of our potential customers live outside our borders, we can’t let countries like China 
write the rules of the global economy. We should write those rules, opening new markets to 
American products while setting high standards for protecting workers and preserving our 
environment.” Statement by the President on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, WHITE HOUSE 
(Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statement-
president-trans-pacific-partnership [https://perma.cc/EWQ6-WX8G]. 
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Asia-Pacific region,112 such as the United States,113 Japan,114 and 
India.115  As with any significant initiatives within this region, the 
BRI will raise serious questions about not only the initiative’s impact 
on the existing regional power structure, but also the various 
responses that the initiative would, or could, elicit from powers in the 
region. 
In sum, many questions still exist about the BRI’s ongoing 
and future development.  The lack of complete answers to these 
questions have no doubt worried policymakers and commentators.  
Yet, the evolving nature of the BRI debate has made salient the 
opportunity to shape and reshape the initiative in the future.  Given 
the BRI’s hitherto lack of concrete policy formulation in the 
intellectual property area, having this opportunity can indeed be a 
blessing in disguise.  With the right focus, proper understanding, and 
appropriate guidance, this new initiative could be harnessed to 
improve the existing international and regional intellectual property 
systems. 
                                                                                                               
 112 See WANG, supra note 8, at 26–27 (discussing the BRI as a way to “realize global 
rebalancing”); see also Li Xing & Paulo Duarte, Conclusion: The One Belt One Road in the 
Politics of Fear and Hope, in MAPPING CHINA’S OBOR INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 279, 286 
(“Asian powers such as India and Japan, and also the United States, are staying away from 
the Chinese [One Belt, One Road] project, seeing it as a Chinese plan to ‘encircle the 
world’.” (quoting an article published in the Financial Times)). 
 113 See MILLER, supra note 8, at 31 (“China wants to create a network of economic 
dependency that will consolidate its regional leadership, enable it to hedge against the United 
States’ alliance structure in Asia . . . .”). 
 114 See id. at 44–46 (discussing Japan’s investment and active engagement in Southeast 
Asia). See generally Jiang Yang, The New Silk Road for China and Japan: Building on 
Shared Legacies, in RETHINKING SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 131 (discussing the BRI as it 
relates to the relationship between China and Japan). 
 115 “Although India stands to gain from new connectivity projects in the region, Delhi 
views with considerable suspicion Chinese motivations and the long-term strategic 
ramifications of expanding Chinese economic influence in the region.” Mayer, supra note 
18, at 15; see also Yang, supra note 69, at 18–19 (exploring whether the BRI is “squeezing 
India’s development space”). For discussions of India’s perspectives on the BRI, see 
generally Darshana M. Baruah & C. Raja Mohan, Connectivity and Regional Integration: 
Prospects for Sino-Indian Cooperation, in RETHINKING SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 85; 
Nivedita Das Kundu, Continental Aspect of the “One Belt One Road”: India’s Perspective, 
in CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD, supra note 8, at 43; M.H. Rajesh, Maritime Silk Road: An 
Indian Perspective, in CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD, supra note 8, at 68; Song Haixiao, The 
Belt and Road Initiative: India’s Strategy and Its Effect, in CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD 
INITIATIVES, supra note 8, at 109. 
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III.     New Intellectual Property Infrastructure 
Since the mid-1980s, China has been heavily criticized for its 
lack of protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights.116  
Although China’s WTO accession and the repeated overhauls of its 
copyright, patent, and trademark systems have led to tremendous 
improvements,117 China continues to struggle with a massive piracy 
and counterfeiting problem.  In March 2018, the Office of the United 
States Trade Representative filed a WTO complaint against China for 
its failure to comply with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights118 (TRIPS Agreement).119  That 
complaint built on the Section 301 investigation120 that the Trump 
administration launched in August 2017 to review Chinese laws, 
policies, and practices in the areas of intellectual property, 
innovation, and technology development.121  Because China and the 
                                                                                                               
 116 For the Author’s earlier discussions of the piracy and counterfeiting problems in 
China, see generally Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property 
in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000); Peter K. Yu, From 
Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 
AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and 
the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO 
OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st ed. 
2007) [hereinafter Yu, China Puzzle]. 
 117 The Trademark Law was adopted in August 1982 and was amended in February 
1993, October 2001, and August 2013. Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, amended Aug. 
30, 2013, effective May 1, 2014) (China). The Patent Law was adopted in 1984 and was 
amended in September 1992, August 2000, and December 2008. Patent Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 
1984, amended Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009) (China). The Copyright Law was 
adopted in September 1990 and amended in October 2001 and February 2010. Copyright 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective Oct. 27, 2001) (China). 
 118 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 119 See Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Certain Measures 
Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/1 (Mar. 
23, 2018) [hereinafter Second TRIPS Complaint] (providing the complaint). 
 120 Section 301 permits the President to investigate and impose sanctions on countries 
engaging in unfair trade practices that threaten the United States’ economic interests. See 19 
U.S.C. §§ 2411–2420 (2018). 
 121 See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Announces 
Initiation of Section 301 Investigation of China (Aug. 18, 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-
us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/august/ustr-announces-initiation-section 
[https://perma.cc/7JF7-JFX2] (announcing the launch of the investigation); see also OFFICE 
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United States failed to resolve the complaint through consultation, the 
WTO established a panel in November 2018.122 
Notwithstanding these troubling developments, the discourse 
on intellectual property protection in China has been slowly 
changing,123 especially when one closely examines the statistics 
provided by international and regional organizations.  Based on the 
latest WIPO statistics, in 2018 China stood behind only the United 
States in terms of the number of international applications124 filed 
through the Patent Cooperation Treaty.125  Among corporate 
applicants, Huawei Technologies, ZTE Corporation, and BOE 
Technology Group—all Chinese companies—ranked among the 
world’s top ten based on international patent applications.126  For the 
same year, China ranked third in the number of international 
                                                                                                               
OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, 
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (2018) (providing the final 
report of the investigation); OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, UPDATE 
CONCERNING CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION (2018) (providing an update to the earlier 
report). 
 122 See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China—Certain 
Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS542/8 (Oct. 19, 2018) (requesting the establishment of a WTO panel). 
 123 As I noted in an earlier article: 
While piracy and counterfeiting problems continue to exist, and are 
unlikely to go away any time soon, many policymakers and 
commentators now see China as an innovative power, or at least an 
emerging one. They also explore whether the innovation in China 
complements or rivals the innovation in other parts of the world. 
Peter K. Yu, When the Chinese Intellectual Property System Hits 35, 8 QUEEN MARY J. 
INTELL. PROP. 3, 6–7 (2018) [hereinafter Yu, When the System Hits 35]; see also Yu, Half-
Century of Scholarship, supra note 1, at 1103–07 (discussing the growing body of 
scholarship that has emerged in the mid-2000s and the early 2010s to examine China’s 
changing innovative capabilities). 
 124 Who Filed the Most PCT Patent Applications in 2018?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_pct_2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8KVN-5QTS] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 125 Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231. 
 126 Who Filed the Most PCT Patent Applications in 2018?, supra note 124. 
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trademark applications127 under the Madrid Agreement Concerning 
the International Registration of Marks and its related protocol.128 
The WIPO figures are well corroborated by the statistics 
provided by national and regional patent offices.  According to the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office, Chinese residents were 
behind only those of Japan, South Korea, and Germany in 2017 in 
terms of patent applications filed in the United States.129  The 
European Patent Office also found that about 16 per cent of its patent 
filings in that same year originated in China, which trailed behind 
only the United States and Japan.130  As if these metrics were not 
impressive enough, China now ranks 17th in the Global Innovation 
Index, marking the country’s trajectory of progress in the innovation 
area.131 
Given these two diametrically opposed sets of developments, 
it is timely and constructive to explore what cooperation the BRI 
could facilitate in the intellectual property area.  Such exploration will 
be particularly important given the possibility for other countries 
along the Belt and Road to initiate such cooperation.  As the Chinese 
government stated in Vision and Actions, the initiative “should be 
jointly built through consultation to meet the interests of all.”132  That 
document noted further the country’s readiness to “conduct equal-
footed consultation with all countries along the Belt and Road.”133 
To help identify the myriad possibilities for bilateral, 
regional, and international cooperation and to take advantage of the 
BRI’s lack of concrete policy formulation in the intellectual property 
area, this Part examines six distinct areas: (1) substantive standards; 
                                                                                                               
 127 Who Filed the Most Madrid Trademark Applications in 2018?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
ORG., 
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_madrid_2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E65G-7WLE] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 128 Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 
1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967); Protocol Relating to the 
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, June 27, 1989, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 106-41. 
 129 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT—FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 174–75 (2018) [hereinafter USPTO REPORT]. 
 130 European Patent Filings per Country of Origin, EUR. PAT. OFF., 
https://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-reports-statistics/annual-report/2017/statistics/patent-
filings.html#tab1 [https://perma.cc/3NFL-TJH4] (last visited Sept. 18, 2017). 
 131 GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2018: ENERGIZING THE WORLD WITH INNOVATION, at xx 
(Soumitra Dutta et al. eds., 2018). 
 132 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, preface. 
 133 Id. pt. VIII. 
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(2) procedural arrangements; (3) cross-border enforcement; (4) 
dispute resolution; (5) technical cooperation; and (6) market 
aggregation.  Focusing on each area in turn, this Part highlights the 
different constructive possibilities that the BRI can realize in the 
intellectual property area.  It is worth noting that these six areas are 
not meant to be exhaustive; rather, they are chosen to illustrate the 
BRI’s many prospects and potential contributions. 
A.     Substantive Standards 
As far as China and intellectual property are concerned, 
considerable attention has been devoted to questions concerning the 
country’s engagement with international and regional norms:134  Is 
China complying with these norms? Incorporating them into its laws?  
Trying to reshape existing norms?  Or attempting to create new ones? 
To address these questions, commentators have advanced the 
quadchotomy of norm breaker, norm taker, norm shaker, and norm 
maker to evaluate China’s engagement with international norms.135  
In the first two decades after China’s reopening to the outside world, 
this discussion of norm engagement has focused primarily on norm 
breaking and norm taking.136  In recent years, however, the discussion 
has slowly expanded to cover norm shaking and norm making.  As I 
noted in an earlier article: 
Although piracy and counterfeiting remain major 
problems within the country, China is not the 
                                                                                                               
 134 See Ahl, supra note 103 (using the trichotomy of “obeying,” “using,” and “shaping” 
to analyze China’s performance in public international law, and human rights in particular); 
Henry Gao, China’s Ascent in Global Trade Governance: From Rule Taker to Rule Shaker 
and, Maybe Rule Maker?, in MAKING GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE WORK FOR 
DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES AND PRIORITIES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 153 (Carolyn 
Deere Birkbeck ed., 2011) (using the trichotomy of “rule taker,” “rule shaker,” and “rule 
maker” to examine China’s performance in the global trade arena); Gregory Shaffer & Henry 
Gao, China’s Rise: How It Took on the U.S. at the WTO, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 119 
(“China successfully moved from being a ‘rule taker’ to a ‘rule shaker’ to a ‘rule maker.’”); 
Yu, Rise of China, supra note 11 (examining China’s rise in the international intellectual 
property regime, with a focus on the country’s engagement with international intellectual 
property norms); Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 13, at 223–58 (identifying three distinct 
phases in which China engages with international intellectual property norms following its 
WTO accession). 
 135 See Yu, Rise of China, supra note 11, at 426–29 (advancing this quadchotomy). 
 136 See Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 13, at 212–37 (discussing the “norm breaker” 
and “norm taker” phases). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol14/iss3/1
2019] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.  305 
 
traditional norm breaker one typically infers from its 
disappointing record of intellectual property 
protection.  Instead, the country has been a norm taker 
for most of its participation in the international 
intellectual property regime.  As its strength, 
experience, and self-confidence grow, it slowly 
assumes the additional roles of a norm shaker and a 
norm maker.137 
While it remains difficult to clearly distinguish between norm 
shaking and norm making,138 the increased development in both 
directions has suggested China’s rapidly changing position.  Given 
the many international norms involved in the BRI, the country’s new 
position on norm engagement will no doubt color the development of 
this initiative. 
Admittedly, there is an irresistible urge to explore whether the 
BRI would lead to more legal transplants139—a narrative that is 
familiar to those studying the historical evolution of the Chinese 
                                                                                                               
 137 Id. at 258–59. 
 138 See id. at 250–51 (“[N]orm shaking and norm making represent two sides of the same 
coin. A norm that has been shaken up and transformed will necessarily result in the making 
of a new norm.”). 
 139 The expectation of such transplants is understandable. As Lutz-Christian Wolff 
explained: 
China is the B&R initiator and arguably the most economically and 
politically powerful of the B&R states. One therefore has to assume that 
China will, to a certain extent, dominate relationships with and between 
the B&R states. This could also mean that Chinese law and Chinese legal 
culture will be “exported” to other B&R states, e.g., as a result of joint 
legislative initiatives, because Chinese law functions as a role model for 
other B&R states, or simply because economic co-operations between 
parties from B&R states will be based on contractual arrangements that 
adopt Chinese law as the governing law. 
Lutz-Christian Wolff, The Flexibility of Chinese Law—Trick or Treat for the “Belt and 
Road” Initiative?, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7, at 593, 594. For discussions of legal 
transplant, see generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993); Peter K. Yu, The Transplant and Transformation of 
Intellectual Property Laws in China [hereinafter Yu, Transplant and Transformation], in 
GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND EUROPE 20 (Nari Lee et al. 
eds., 2016) [hereinafter CHINA AND EUROPE]; Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in 
International Copyright: Some Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199 (1994); 
Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974); 
Peter K. Yu, Can the Canadian UGC Exception Be Transplanted Abroad?, 26 INTELL. PROP. 
J. 175 (2014); Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong, 
48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693 (2010). 
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intellectual property system.140  Nevertheless, there is no indication 
of such transplant efforts yet.  A case in point is the negotiations for 
the RCEP intellectual property chapter.  Despite being a dominant 
player, China has thus far kept a rather low profile in those 
negotiations.141  As revealed by Knowledge Ecology International, 
China did not advance any draft text for the chapter.  Instead, the four 
draft texts came from ASEAN, India, Japan, and South Korea.142  The 
only area in which China has taken a more assertive position concerns 
the disclosure in patent applications of the origin or source of genetic 
resources used in inventions.143  That disclosure requirement 
resembles, however, Article 26 of the Chinese Patent Law, which 
requires patent applicants to disclose the traditional knowledge and 
genetic resources used in their inventions.144  The requirement is also 
consistent with the TRIPS Article 29bis proposal that China has 
cosponsored with other developing country members of the WTO.145 
                                                                                                               
 140 See generally WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 30–55 (1995) (discussing foreign 
transplants in the intellectual property area and how the Chinese “learned the law at 
gunpoint”); Niklas Bruun & Zhang Liguo, Legal Transplant of Intellectual Property Rights 
in China: Norm Taker or Norm Maker?, in CHINA AND EUROPE, supra note 139, at 43 
(discussing the interaction between the transplant of intellectual property laws and the 
building of intellectual property norms as a dynamic process); Li Mingde, Intellectual 
Property Law Revision in China: Transplantation and Transformation, in CHINA AND 
EUROPE, supra note 139, at 65 (discussing the transplant of international intellectual property 
norms to China and the effort the country has made to assimilate those norms into its special 
political, economic, and social structures); Yu, Transplant and Transformation, supra note 
139 (providing a history of the transplant of intellectual property laws in China and 
discussing the strengths, weaknesses, and future of such efforts). 
 141 See Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 13, at 229–37 (exploring why China has 
assumed a low profile in the international intellectual property arena). 
 142 See Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 2, at 683–84 (noting the various 
draft texts and providing sources for these texts). 
 143 See id. at 716–17 (discussing China’s proposal). 
 144 See Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 
2009), art. 26 (China) (“With regard to an invention-creation accomplished by relying on 
genetic resources, the applicant shall, in the patent application documents, indicate the direct 
and original source of the genetic resources. If the applicant cannot indicate the original 
source, he shall state the reasons.”). 
 145 See Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Peru, 
Thailand, and Tanzania, Doha Work Programme—The Outstanding Implementation Issue 
on the Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2 (July 5, 2006) (proposing an amendment to 
create a new obligation to disclose in patent applications the origin of the biological 
resources and traditional knowledge used in inventions). 
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If the RCEP negotiations can provide any guidance on 
China’s position in international and regional norm setting, the BRI 
will unlikely be the conduit for exporting Chinese intellectual 
property standards along the Belt and Road.  Instead, any effort to 
transplant these standards and related practices will likely take a more 
indirect route—for example, by requiring foreign companies entering 
the Chinese market to embrace local standards and practices.  This 
indirect route can be highly effective because many countries along 
the Belt and Road could ill afford to lose this lucrative market.146 
B.     Procedural Arrangements 
Compared with substantive standards, China is more likely to 
export its procedural arrangements.  In the past decade, the State 
Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO), now the National 
Intellectual Property Administration of China (CNIPA), has worked 
closely with other intellectual property offices to streamline and 
harmonize the patent examination systems.147  Since 2007, SIPO has 
joined the European Patent Office, the Japan Patent Office, the 
Korean Intellectual Property Office, and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office in the so-called “IP5” discussions.148  These 
discussions have not only streamlined the patent examination process 
involving applications from the five participating countries, but have 
also consolidated SIPO’s status as “a player in the top tier of patent 
offices that will dominate the emerging system of global patent 
administration.”149 
                                                                                                               
 146 See Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 2, at 727 (“For [many poor and 
weak developing countries], it is just not a viable option to lose the new trade and trade-
related benefits provided by Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and 
other more powerful neighbors through the RCEP.”); see also MILLER, supra note 8, at 18 
(“The challenge for countries on China’s periphery is how to extract as much economic 
benefit from China, in terms of trade and investment, without losing political and economic 
sovereignty.”). 
 147 For discussions of SIPO and its related developments, see generally PETER DRAHOS, 
THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES AND THEIR CLIENTS 221–36 
(2010); Cheng Wenting & Peter Drahos, How China Built the World’s Biggest Patent 
Office—The Pressure Driving Mechanism, 49 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 
5 (2018). 
 148 Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 13, at 243; see also About IP5 Co-operation, 
https://www.fiveipoffices.org/about.html [https://perma.cc/W68G-SAFM] (last visited Oct. 
28, 2018) (providing an overview of IP5 cooperation). 
 149 DRAHOS, supra note 147, at 233. 
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For many countries along the Belt and Road, the recent 
developments in China have been highly impressive and have thereby 
enhanced the appeal of Chinese institutions, policies, and practices.150  
In 2017, SIPO received nearly 3.7 million patent applications, with 
over 3.5 million originating from domestic applicants.151  The office 
also issued 420,144 invention patents152—a figure compared 
favorably with that of the United States.153  By 2012, China has 
already surpassed the target of two million patent applications per 
year SIPO laid down in its National Patent Development Strategy 
(2011–2020).154 
In view of these numbers, it is not difficult to understand why 
intellectual property offices and industries along the Belt and Road 
                                                                                                               
 150 See STEFAN A. HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN 
MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 31 (2010) (noting “a growing number 
of developing nations that are loosely connected by an admiration for China”); MARK 
LEONARD, WHAT DOES CHINA THINK? 122 (2008) (“[G]overnment research teams from Iran 
to Egypt, Angola to Zambia, Kazakhstan to Russia, India to Vietnam and Brazil to Venezuela 
have been crawling around the Chinese cities and countryside in search of lessons from 
Beijing’s experience.”); Stephen Marks, Introduction to AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA 
IN AFRICA 1, 11 (Firoze Manji & Stephen Marks eds., 2007) (citing Nigerians’ appreciation 
of the Chinese model for providing stability and visionary leadership). 
 151 See Table 1 Statistics on Applications for Inventions from Home and Abroad, NAT’L 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ADMIN. CHINA,  
http://english.cnipa.gov.cn/statistics/2017s/201712/1111449.htm [https://perma.cc/JCP7-
RG28] (last visited May 9, 2018) (stating that in 2017 SIPO received a total of 1,381,594 
applications for invention patents, out of which 1,245,709 belonged to domestic applicants); 
Table 2 Statistics on Applications for Utility Model and Design from Home and Abroad, 
NAT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ADMIN. CHINA,  
http://english.cnipa.gov.cn/statistics/2017s/201712/1111448.htm [https://perma.cc/J4RQ-
F2XR] (last visited May 9,2018) (stating that in 2017 SIPO received a total of 1,687,593 
applications for utility model patents and 628,658 applications for design patents, out of 
which 1,679,807 and 610,817, respectively, originate from domestic applicants). 
 152 See Table 4 Distribution of Grants for Inventions Received from Home and Abroad, 
NAT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ADMIN. CHINA,  
http://english.cnipa.gov.cn/statistics/2017s/201712/1111446.htm [https://perma.cc/DK5X-
8RXA] (last visited May 9, 2018) (stating that in 2017 SIPO granted a total of 420,144 
invention patents, out of which 326,970 belonged to domestic applicants). 
 153 See USPTO REPORT, supra note 129, at 168 (stating that the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office issued 347,243 patents in 2017). 
 154 STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
(2011–2020) pt. III (2011) (China), translated at  
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/SIPONatPatentDevStrategy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HDQ3-W2XJ] [hereinafter NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY]; 
see also Steve Lohr, When Innovation, Too, Is Made in China, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/business/02unboxed.html [https://perma.cc/XA6K-
2P9H] (stating that David Kappos, the director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 
described SIPO’s 2015 targets as “mind-blowing numbers”). 
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have been eager to work closely with their counterparts in China.  
Considering the critical importance of the Chinese market to rights 
holders in countries along the Belt and Road, a streamlined process 
for applying for patents, trademarks, designs, and other forms of 
intellectual property rights can be highly beneficial.155  Indeed, there 
is a strong possibility that China will consider extending streamlined 
arrangements similar to those under the IP5 to intellectual property 
offices along the Belt and Road.  As Lee Jyh-an observed, “[b]y 
expanding [the IP5] experiences to collaboration with IP authorities 
in [Belt and Road] countries, China will not only share its expertise 
in IP administration, such as patent examination, but also help 
domestic industries to seek better IP protection in those foreign 
countries.”156  In addition, greater collaboration between the CNIPA 
and intellectual property offices along the Belt and Road will further 
strengthen the global profile of Chinese intellectual property offices. 
One interesting question relating to both substantive standards 
and procedural arrangements concerns whether China will eventually 
establish a regional system that offers unitary protection, similar to 
what the European Union currently offers in the form of a European 
Union trade mark157 or a European Union design.158  This question 
not only reflects the constant urge of intellectual property rights 
holders to have a more efficient intellectual property system, but also 
                                                                                                               
 155 As a report on China Daily recently observed: 
Since September 2017, China’s granted patent is regarded as effective 
in Cambodia. In addition, starting from April in 2018, Laos has 
acknowledged the results of the patent examination in China. This 
progress has enabled Chinese applicants to obtain patents and IP 
protection in those countries more efficiently. Cumbersome and 
repetitious review procedures no longer exist. 
Li, Intellectual Property in Focus, supra note 61. 
 156 Lee, supra note 7, at 423; see also NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, 
supra note 154, pt. IV, § 5 (“Participate in international cooperation in examination business 
in a pragmatic manner and promote examination capacity building. Strengthen capacity 
building for patent examination.”). 
 157 See Regulation 2017/1001, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 
2017 on the European Union Trade Mark art. 1(2), 2017 O.J. (L 154) 1 (“An EU trade mark 
shall have a unitary character. It shall have equal effect throughout the Union . . . .”). 
 158 See Council Regulation 2002/6, of 12 December 2001 on Community Designs art. 
1(3), as amended by Council Regulation 2006/1891, 2006 O.J. (L 386) 14 (“A Community 
design shall have a unitary character. It shall have equal effect throughout the Community.”). 
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the persistent, albeit unfulfilled, hope for finally establishing a world 
patent or trademark system.159 
Despite these aspirations, the Asia-Pacific region has not seen 
much success in creating arrangements comparable to what the 
European Union now offers.  Although ASEAN members have 
worked closely with each other in the intellectual property area,160 it 
has not yet offered any unified intellectual property rights in the ten-
member association.161  Thus, if any arrangements are to be offered 
through the BRI, such arrangements are likely to be closer to the 
European Patent Convention162 than the European Union Trade Mark 
system.163 
                                                                                                               
 159 But see John H. Barton, Issues Posed by a World Patent System, in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIME 617, 617 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (“There 
is a strong drive toward a world patent system, but such a system may pose special problems 
for the developing world.”); Friedrich-Karl Beier, One Hundred Years of International 
Cooperation—The Role of the Paris Convention in the Past, Present and Future, 15 INT’L 
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 1, 8 (1984) (“In view of the large variety of national laws 
and interests, . . . [the] idealistic concept of an international uniform law [under the Paris 
Convention] proved too utopian. And in fact, the idea of a ‘world patent’ or ‘world 
trademark,’ which was subsequently revived still remains a castle in the sky.”); Sam 
Ricketson, The Birth of the Berne Union, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 9, 19 (1986) 
(discussing the political difficulty in creating uniform protection in the Berne Convention). 
 160 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of the Member States 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China on Cooperation in the Field of Intellectual Property, ASEAN-China, Dec. 21, 2009, 
https://www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/15thsummit/MoU-China-IP-Eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W6DD-BFJ4] (providing a memorandum of understanding to foster 
cooperation in the intellectual property area). 
 161 See ALEXANDER DEGELSEGGER ET AL., ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS FOR 
INNOVATION 13 (2016) (“The IP institutions, such as national IP offices, are likely to invest 
more in regional cooperation to ease IP development and protection, with a unified IP (e.g. 
patent) for the region in question as the ultimate possible objective, but with more 
harmonisation and easier procedures as the likely second bests.”); see also Yu, ASEAN–
China Strategic Partnership, supra note 21 (discussing the cooperative efforts between 
ASEAN and China in the intellectual property area). 
 162 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, as amended by Decision 
of the Administration Council of the European Patent Organization of Dec. 21, 1978, 13 
I.L.M. 268 (1974). 
 163 See Röhr, supra note 110, at 234 (“No one in Berlin’s foreign policy establishment 
believes . . . that the Silk Road initiative could eventually become something even remotely 
akin to the [European Union].”). 
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C.     Cross-Border Enforcement 
Cross-border enforcement is of great significance to Asia and 
the developing world.164  Such enforcement, by extension, will have 
a considerable impact on the BRI.  Given China’s continued struggle 
with a massive piracy and counterfeiting problem—and the fact that 
this problem is unlikely to go away in the near future165—it is 
doubtful that China will take any aggressive position on intellectual 
property enforcement in its dealing with countries along the Belt and 
Road, similar to what developed countries did during the ACTA 
negotiations.166  Indeed, the lack of strong intellectual property 
enforcement standards in the RCEP intellectual property chapter 
provides a highly revealing contrast.167 
Nevertheless, with the rapidly expanding volumes of 
intellectual property Chinese firms and nationals now own, the 
country has slowly moved into a position where it can benefit from 
stronger enforcement of intellectual property rights, even if such 
benefits still do not compare favorably with those enjoyed by the 
European Union or the United States.168  China will therefore have a 
                                                                                                               
 164 See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 329, 379 (2012) (“Enforcement will remain a key issue for many Asian countries in at 
least the next decade.”). 
 165 See Yu, When the System Hits 35, supra note 123, at 6 (noting that “piracy and 
counterfeiting problems . . . are unlikely to go away any time soon”). 
 166 For the Author’s discussions of intellectual property enforcement, see generally Peter 
K. Yu, Digital Copyright Enforcement Measures and Their Human Rights Threats, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 455 (Christophe 
Geiger ed., 2015); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement: A Neglected Child in the Intellectual Property 
Family, in THE INTERNET AND THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NEW FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 279 (Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais eds., 2016); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual 
Property Enforcement and Global Climate Change, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 107 (Joshua D. Sarnoff ed., 2016); Peter K. 
Yu, Why Are the TRIPS Enforcement Provisions Ineffective?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 770 (Paul Torremans ed., 2014); 
Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1 (2010); Yu, What 
Enforcement?, supra note 97. 
 167 See Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 2, at 714–16 (discussing the 
enforcement provisions in the draft RCEP intellectual property chapter). 
 168 See Charges for the Use of Intellectual Property, Payments (BoP, Current US$), 
WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BM.GSR.ROYL.CD  
[https://perma.cc/VQQ7-MDAT] (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) (stating that the charges are 
$28.66 billion and $48.35 billion for China and the United States, respectively, and that the 
charges for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom combined are already $40.15 billion). 
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strong interest in helping other countries along the Belt and Road to 
strengthen intellectual property enforcement. 
Given China’s continued reluctance to demand stronger 
intellectual property enforcement standards at the international and 
regional levels, the country will likely focus on improving intellectual 
property enforcement through international and regional cooperation 
and greater information sharing between intellectual property 
enforcement authorities.  As the Chinese government stated in Vision 
and Actions, “[c]ountries along the Belt and Road should enhance 
customs cooperation such as information exchange, mutual 
recognition of regulations, and mutual assistance in law 
enforcement.”169  To some extent, the approach outlined in this 
guiding document is similar to the one stated in Section 10 of the draft 
RCEP intellectual property chapter, which is devoted to cooperation 
and consultation.170  ACTA also contains some strong language 
regarding the use of shared information to improve enforcement,171 
even though China may understandably remain reluctant to embrace 
such language. 
As far as cross-border enforcement is concerned, greater 
cooperation and information sharing can be highly effective.172  After 
all, piracy and counterfeiting activities can be stopped at the border 
of either the in-bound or out-bound country.  Notwithstanding these 
dual possibilities, the comprehensive enforcement provisions in the 
TRIPS Agreement do not focus on exports.173  As the WTO panel 
                                                                                                               
 169 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. IV; see also STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY ¶ 48 
(2008), http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm  
[https://perma.cc/ALN6-UZ2P] [hereinafter NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
STRATEGY] (“International cooperation in customs law enforcement needs to be fully utilized 
in order to effectively crack down on cross-border illegal acts and crimes involving 
intellectual property.”). 
 170 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Intellectual Property Chapter § 10 
(Oct. 15 draft),  
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/RCEP-IP-Chapter-150ctober2015.docx 
[https://perma.cc/TKQ3-MDVL]. 
 171 See ACTA, supra note 97, art. 34(a) (stipulating that “each Party shall endeavour to 
exchange with other Parties . . . information the Party collects under the provisions of 
Chapter III (Enforcement Practices), including statistical data and information on best 
practices”). 
 172 See Lee, supra note 7, at 423 (“[T]he Chinese customs authority must cooperate with 
its counterparts along the [BRI] and enforce border measures.”). 
 173 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 118, arts. 41–61 (stipulating provisions covering 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights); see also Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ 
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made clear in China—Measures Affecting the Protection and 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Article 59 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which covers remedies in the intellectual property 
enforcement section, “is not applicable to the Customs measures 
insofar as those measures apply to goods destined for exportation.”174  
It is therefore no surprise that ACTA sought to change the TRIPS 
position by extending the enforcement provisions to both imports and 
exports.  Covering border measures, Article 16 of that agreement 
states expressly that “[e]ach Party shall adopt or maintain procedures 
with respect to import and export shipments.”175 
D.     Dispute Resolution 
Although legal commentators rarely consider Asian countries 
litigious,176 and industries and governments have frequently 
criticized the region for offering inadequate protection of intellectual 
property rights,177 China has now emerged as the world’s most 
litigious country in the intellectual property area.178  As the Supreme 
                                                                                                               
Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 481–82 (2011) (“With twenty-one provisions on obligations 
that range from border measures to criminal sanctions, the TRIPS Agreement, for the first 
time, provides comprehensive international minimum standards on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights.”). 
 174 Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, ¶ 7.231, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan. 26, 2009). 
 175 ACTA, supra note 97, art. 16.1. 
 176 See, e.g., William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 51, 
67 (1987) (“[T]he United States is a more litigious society than Japan, which places a high 
premium on consensus.”). 
 177 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2018 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 9 (2018) 
(placing China, India, and Indonesia on the Priority Watch List and Pakistan, Thailand, and 
Vietnam on the Watch List); Letter from Kevin M. Rosenbaum, Int’l Intellectual Prop. 
Alliance, to Daniel Lee, Acting Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Innovation and 
Intellectual Prop., Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Feb. 7, 2019) (recommending 
that China, India, Taiwan, and Vietnam be placed on the Priority Watch List and Indonesia 
and Thailand be placed on the Watch List). 
 178 See Peter K. Yu, Foreword to PATENTS AND INNOVATION IN MAINLAND CHINA AND 
HONG KONG: TWO SYSTEMS IN ONE COUNTRY COMPARED xiv, xvi (Li Yahong ed., 2017) 
(“With over 12,000 patent lawsuits in 2016, as reported by the Supreme People’s Court, 
China is now one of the world’s preferred venues for patent litigation.”); J. Benjamin Bai & 
Da Guoping, Strategies for Trade Secrets Protection in China, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 351, 351 (2011) (“China became the world’s most litigious country for intellectual 
property disputes in 2005, surpassing the U.S. in the number of intellectual property lawsuits 
filed annually.”); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We Hardly Know: Revealing the New 
China’s Intellectual Property Regime, 55 ST. LOUIS L.J. 773, 775 (2011) (comparing the 
patent, copyright, and trademark cases filed in the United States in 2005 and 2006 with those 
filed in China); Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 
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People’s Court of China stated in its 2018 report, over 16,000 new 
patent cases were filed in 2017, featuring an increase of close to 30 
percent.179  That same report also showed the filing of close to 38,000 
new trademark cases and over 137,000 new copyright cases, with 
increases of close to 40 and 60 percent, respectively.180 
In view of China’s growing litigiousness in the intellectual 
property area, it is not difficult to understand why the resolution of 
private disputes has recently received considerable attention among 
Chinese policymakers and commentators.181  Indeed, legal risks have 
been highlighted as one of the BRI’s potential challenges.  As Wang 
Yiwei observed: 
[T]he Belt and Road Initiative involves more than 60 
countries with the legal systems being different [from] 
that of China.  This will give rise to the risk of 
asymmetric legal information.  According to legal 
systems, countries involved in the initiative mainly 
                                                                                                               
CAMPBELL L. REV. 525, 544–49 (2012) (discussing the potential intellectual property 
litigation explosion in China). 
 179 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE STATUS OF 
JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINESE COURTS (2017) 3 
(2018), https://chinaipr2.files.wordpress.com/2018/06/2017e799bde79aaee4b9a6-
2018041.docx [https://perma.cc/X8LN-E5UM] (reporting the number of new patent cases at 
16,010). 
 180 Id. (reporting the number of new trademark and copyright cases at 37,946 and 
137,267, respectively). 
 181 Countries have generally attempted to resolve public disputes under two different 
routes. The first is the state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism, such as the one under the 
WTO. See Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (providing the rules for the WTO dispute 
settlement process). The second route is the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, 
such as the one provided in the investment chapter in bilateral, regional, or plurilateral trade 
agreements. See Bath, supra note 85, at 182–87 (discussing investor-state dispute settlement 
in the BRI context). For the Author’s discussions of investor-state dispute settlement, see 
generally Peter K. Yu, Conceptual and Institutional Improvements in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INVESTMENT LAW 
(Christophe Geiger ed., forthcoming 2019); Peter K. Yu, Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 463 
(Christophe Geiger et al. eds., 2018); Peter K. Yu, The Pathways of Multinational 
Intellectual Property Dispute Settlement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS PROPERTY: OF 
PHARMACEUTICALS, TOBACCO, COMMODITIES AND OTHER MATTERS (Christopher Heath & 
Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., forthcoming 2019); Peter K. Yu, Crossfertilizing ISDS 
with TRIPS, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321 (2017); Peter K. Yu, The Investment-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 829 (2017). 
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fall into two categories: countries adopting the 
continental legal system and those following the 
Anglo-American legal system.  Apart from that, some 
belong to the Islamic legal system. . . .  [By contrast,] 
China has adopted a unique socialist legal system.  
Despite its closeness to the continental legal system, 
when it comes to specific legal regulations, China’s 
system is still different from those of other 
countries.182 
More importantly, “[t]he difference in legal systems can result in 
different outcomes when legal disputes occur, in which case the 
applicability of laws is weakened, and a series of legal risks can 
emerge.”183  Some countries along the Belt and Road may also lack 
sophisticated legislation or effective enforcement mechanisms,184 not 
to mention that the legal systems in these countries can be severely 
underdeveloped.185 
Fortunately, the BRI will benefit from discussions that have 
already started in the BRICS context.  In October 2015, the Shanghai 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission launched 
a pioneering center to resolve private disputes involving the BRICS 
countries.186  “Created with the support of the China Law Society and 
other members of the BRICS legal community,” the BRICS Dispute 
Resolution Centre Shanghai aims to “provide[] alternative dispute 
resolution services for commercial disputes between parties from the 
BRICS countries.”187  Two months before the Eighth BRICS Summit 
in Goa, India in October 2016, members of the BRICS community 
also 
                                                                                                               
 182 WANG, supra note 8, at 113. 
 183 Id. 
 184 As Professor Wang continued, “[T]he legislation of some countries is not 
sophisticated enough with frequent amendments. In terms of law enforcement, these 
countries discriminate against foreign or foreign-funded enterprises, sometimes even issuing 
targeted legal regulations . . . on certain transnational companies to benefit their domestic, 
political and economic situations.” Id. at 113–14. 
 185 See id. at 119 (“The Belt and Road Initiative involves a great many countries, some 
of which have the problem of inefficient legal structures. In their overseas business, there is 
a great possibility that Chinese enterprises will find no laws to follow.”). 
 186 Fernando Dias Simões, A Dispute Resolution Centre for the BRICS?, in BRICS-
LAWYERS’ GUIDE, supra note 1, at 287, 296. 
 187 Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
316 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 14 
 
identified . . . the need to set up a neutral institution 
for the resolution of intra-BRICS commercial and 
investment disputes; to develop the expertise and 
skills of legal professionals in international arbitration 
among BRICS nations to support and ensure the 
success of the BRICS international arbitral 
mechanism; to ensure adequate representation of 
arbitrators from emerging economies to avoid 
structural bias and partiality or the perception thereof 
by arbitrators originating from the developed world; 
and to reform the existing investor state arbitration 
mechanism under the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes . . . and under 
bilateral investment treaties to account for the unique 
circumstances and challenges of emerging 
economies.188 
Outside the BRICS context, some “commentators have urged the 
Chinese government to build a joint IP dispute resolution 
mechanism.”189  A similar mechanism can be established in the BRI 
context. 
E.     Technical Cooperation 
Technical cooperation is seemingly benign, yet it has serious 
ramifications for the development of the intellectual property 
system.190  Indeed, commentators have repeatedly questioned 
                                                                                                               
 188 Id. 
 189 Lee, supra note 7, at 423. See generally Chai Yuhong, Regional Dispute Resolution: 
An International Civil Dispute Resolution Model for East Asia, in INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 261 (calling for the development of an international civil 
dispute resolution model for East Asia). 
 190 Technical cooperation is included as an obligation under Article 67 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which provides as follows: 
In order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement, developed 
country Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed 
terms and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of 
developing and least-developed country Members. Such cooperation 
shall include assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations on the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on 
the prevention of their abuse, and shall include support regarding the 
establishment or reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies 
relevant to these matters, including the training of personnel. 
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whether governments in developed countries and international and 
regional organizations have provided technical assistance in the right 
direction.191  Given the controversy in this area, one would logically 
question whether the assistance China provides through the BRI will 
ultimately benefit developing countries along the Belt and Road.  
This question is particularly timely considering that rapidly 
expanding volumes of intellectual property Chinese firms and 
nationals now own and the growing ability of the Chinese intellectual 
property offices and industry groups to provide technical 
assistance.192 
Notwithstanding this understandable concern, a country’s 
position on technical cooperation tends to be colored by its intention 
to export intellectual property standards.193  Considering that China 
                                                                                                               
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 118, art. 67. 
 191 See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND 
THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 180–
86 (2009) (discussing the use of technical assistance and capacity-building programs to 
advance agendas in TRIPS-related policy debates); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-
Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 25 (2004) (“[T]he countries in 
a position to provide assistance do so on their own terms; that is, they help implement highly 
protectionist regimes, without regard for the actual needs of developing nations.”); Peter K. 
Yu, The Strategic and Discursive Contributions of the Max Planck Principles for Intellectual 
Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, 62 DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 
20, 30 (2014) (“[T]echnical assistance should not be provided based on the interests of donor 
countries or the privileged members of an international intergovernmental organization—be 
it WIPO or the WTO.”); Yu, Thinking About the TPP, supra note 32, at 109 
(“Oftentimes, . . . ‘best practices’ are introduced [by technical assistance experts] without 
regard to a particular country’s local needs, interests, conditions, or priorities.”); see also 
Christopher May, Capacity Building and the (Re)production of Intellectual Property Rights, 
25 THIRD WORLD Q. 821, 822 (2004) (“[C]apacity building for [intellectual property 
rights] . . . may . . . lead to effective ‘epistemic lock-in’: capacity building programmes 
socialise policy makers, practitioners and others into a specific way of dealing with, and 
regulating, [intellectual property rights]. It encourages the development of a TRIPs mind-
set.”). 
 192 See NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, supra note 154, pt. IV, ¶ 12 
(“Increase assistance to developing countries in the capacity building on intellectual property 
and strengthen coordination with developing countries on China’s positions and promote 
common development in patent area.”). 
 193 See DEERE, supra note 191, at 180–86 (discussing the use of technical assistance and 
capacity-building programs to advance agendas in TRIPS-related policy debates); Duncan 
Matthews & Viviana Muñoz-Tellez, Bilateral Technical Assistance and TRIPS: The United 
States, Japan and the European Communities in Comparative Perspective, 9 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 629, 632 (2006) (discussing the technical assistance provided by the United 
States, Japan, and the European Union in accordance with Article 67 of the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
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has thus far remained reluctant to export these standards,194 one has 
to wonder how eager China is to use technical cooperation to covertly 
achieve what it has so far declined to do.  It is worth recalling that the 
BRI has been created in part to build trust in countries along the Belt 
and Road and to promote harmony between them.195  The meager 
benefits of exporting intellectual property standards technical 
cooperation would unlikely compensate for the harm resulting from 
the distrust such covert action would breed in countries along the Belt 
and Road. 
If the BRI is to facilitate technical cooperation, such 
cooperation will likely resemble those aid and cooperation efforts 
China is now undertaking in Africa, South America, and Southeast 
Asia.196  Although these efforts have inevitably raised neocolonial 
concerns,197 they also include generous “early harvest programs” that 
                                                                                                               
 194 See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 195 See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. II (emphasizing that the BRI is 
“harmonious and inclusive”); id. (“The Initiative seeks mutual benefit. It accommodates the 
interests and concerns of all parties involved, and seeks a conjunction of interests and the 
‘biggest common denominator’ for cooperation so as to give full play to the wisdom and 
creativity, strengths and potentials of all parties.”); id. pt. III (“The Belt and Road Initiative 
is a way for win-win cooperation that promotes common development and prosperity and a 
road towards peace and friendship by enhancing mutual understanding and trust . . . .”); see 
also Zhang Jie, Security Environment Around China: Changes, Construction, and 
Challenges, in CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVES, supra note 8, at 13, 33 (“China is 
supposed to strengthen mutual trust in politics and security to create a favorable environment 
for regional economic collaboration, while insisting on maintaining the bottom line of the 
integrity of national sovereignty.”). 
 196 See Wang Yiwei, The Belt and Road—Hot Inside and Cold Outside? A Position 
Essay, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 7, at 95, 98–99 (discussing why the BRI cannot be 
equated with foreign aid). See generally Deborah Brautigam, China’s Foreign Aid in Africa: 
What Do We Know, in CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE 197 (Robert I. 
Rotberg ed., 2008) (discussing China’s foreign aid in Africa); DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE 
DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA (2010) (providing a comprehensive 
account of China’s aid and economic cooperation in Africa). For discussions of China’s 
engagement with Africa, see generally AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA (Firoze 
Manji & Stephen Marks eds., 2007); CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 14; 
CHINA INTO AFRICA, supra; CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA: A RISING POWER AND A CONTINENT 
EMBRACE (Chris Alden et al. eds., 2008); CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA AND THE SOUTH: A 
SEARCH FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE (Dorothy-Grace Guerrero & Firoze Manji eds., 2008) 
[hereinafter CHINA’S NEW ROLE]; THE RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN AFRICA: CHALLENGES, 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS (Fantu Cheru & Cyril Obi eds. 2010) 
[hereinafter RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN AFRICA]; IAN TAYLOR, CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN 
AFRICA (2009). 
 197 As two commentators observed: 
There is a growing concern in Africa that the increasing engagement of 
the Asian giants, in their search for energy and minerals, could, if not 
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enable qualified trading partners to obtain early access to select 
sectors of the Chinese market.198  To a large extent, these early 
harvest programs fit well with what Joshua Kurlantzick has described 
as China’s “charm offensive,” one of BRI’s potential goals.199 
One question that will likely arise in this area concerns 
technology transfer.  The TRIPS Agreement has built such transfer 
into Article 66, which requires developed countries to provide 
incentives for their businesses and institutions to promote and 
encourage technology transfer to least developed countries.200  
Although China is still a developing country and does not bear any 
technology transfer obligation under Article 66, China’s “emerging 
power” status has likely generated expectation that the country will 
at least transfer some technology to its poor neighbors along the Belt 
and Road. 
In Vision and Actions, the Chinese government affirmed its 
“commit[ment] to shouldering more responsibilities and obligations 
within its capabilities, and making greater contributions to the peace 
and development of mankind.”201  Emphasizing the goal of building 
“people-to-people bonds,” that document also stated that China and 
countries along the Belt and Road “should increase . . . cooperation 
                                                                                                               
managed properly, turn out to be just as bad as the “scramble for 
resources” that led to the colonization of the continent during the second 
half of the nineteenth century. 
Fantu Cheru & Cyril Obi, Introduction—Africa in the Twenty-First Century: Strategic and 
Development Challenges, in RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN AFRICA, supra note 196, at 1, 6; see 
also R. EVAN ELLIS, CHINA IN LATIN AMERICA: THE WHATS AND WHEREFORES 1 (2009) 
(noting “concern about the long-term geopolitical ambitions of [China] and worry about 
exchanging one form of dependency for another”); Dot Keet, The Role and Impact of 
Chinese Economic Operations in Africa, in CHINA’S NEW ROLE, supra note 196, 78, 81 
(questioning “whether the rapidly growing role of China . . . is one of partnership and 
cooperation, or more akin to colonial or neocolonial patterns, or reflective of a new 
imperialism”); MILLER, supra note 8, at 80 (“As China bankrolls development across Central 
Asia, ordinary people fear being swallowed by their neighbor.”); TAYLOR, supra note 196, 
at 2 (“Our African partners really have to watch out that they will not be facing a new process 
of colonization [in their relations with China].” (quoting Karin Kortmann, Parliamentary 
State Secretary, German Development Ministry)). 
 198 See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 5, at 996–97 (discussing these 
programs). 
 199 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 200 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 118, art. 66(2) (“Developed country Members 
shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of 
promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members in 
order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.”). 
 201 VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. I. 
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in science and technology, establish joint labs (or research centers), 
international technology transfer centers and maritime cooperation 
centers, promote sci-tech personnel exchanges, cooperate in tackling 
key sci-tech problems, and work together to improve sci-tech 
innovation capability.”202  At the High Level Conference on 
Intellectual Property for Countries Along the “Belt and Road” in July 
2016, State Councilor Wang Yong also noted that the BRI could 
provide assistance in the area of “joint human resources training.”203 
The expectation that China will share a greater burden on 
technology transfer is not difficult to understand when one considers 
the BRI’s considerable potential to enhance China’s position in 
science and technology.  As Wang Yiwei observed, “[T]he Belt and 
Road is a high-tech road, in which China’s capital and technology 
will be used to promote the high quality ‘Made in China’ brand in the 
big markets of Europe and Asia.”204  The initiative will also greatly 
improve China’s global competitiveness.  As Professor Wang 
continued: 
China’s competitiveness will be improved in an all-
round manner.  Based on the initiative, China will 
identify new comparative advantages through all-
dimensional opening-up in the system of global labor 
division.  In the new round of global competition, 
China climbs up the global industrial chain from its 
low-end to high-end, and China’s comparative 
advantages also upgrade from being labor-and-
resource-intensive to technology-and-capital-
intensive.205 
Ironically, the issue about technology transfer appeared in the 
United States’ recent WTO complaint against China.206  Focusing on 
                                                                                                               
 202 Id. pt. IV; see also Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen & Su Ping, Knowledge-Based 
Institutions in Sino-Arctic Engagement: Lessons for the Belt and Road Initiative, in 
RETHINKING SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 147 (discussing active Sino-Arctic cooperation 
through knowledge-based institutions). 
 203 Belt and Road Conference Release, supra note 57; see also NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY STRATEGY, supra note 169, ¶ 65 (“Encourage international cooperation on 
training of intellectual property professionals.”). 
 204 WANG, supra note 8, at 12. 
 205 Id. at 18. 
 206 Second TRIPS Complaint, supra note 119. 
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the topic of “forced technology transfer,” the complaint alleged that 
“China deprive[d] foreign intellectual property rights holders of the 
ability to protect their intellectual property rights in China as well as 
freely negotiate market-based terms in licensing and other 
technology-related contracts.”207  Whether China wins or loses in this 
dispute, the WTO panel decision will likely have some impact on the 
future interpretation of the technology transfer obligations under 
Articles 7 and 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement.208  By extension, the 
case will therefore have some consequences—both intended and 
unintended—on the future of technology transfer along the Belt and 
Road. 
F.      Market Aggregation 
The final area of potential cooperation through the BRI 
concerns market aggregation, which is particularly important for 
small countries along the Belt and Road.  For these countries, the 
opportunity to connect with other countries, especially larger ones, 
will greatly enhance their ability to participate in international and 
regional trade, attract foreign direct investment, or develop regulatory 
solutions to cross-border problems.  As I noted in relation to the 
recent amendment to the TRIPS Agreement: 
[The regional pooling arrangement provided by 
Article 31bis(3) of the TRIPS Agreement] allows less 
developed countries to aggregate their markets to 
generate the purchasing power needed to make the 
development of an indigenous pharmaceutical 
industry attractive.  It also paves the way for the 
development of regional supply centers, procurement 
                                                                                                               
 207 Id. at 1. 
 208 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 118, art. 7 (“The protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights should contribute to . . . the transfer and dissemination of 
technology . . . .”); id. art. 66.2 (“Developed country Members shall provide incentives to 
enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging 
technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a 
sound and viable technological base.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
322 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 14 
 
systems, patent pools and institutions, while 
facilitating technical cooperation within the region.209 
Indeed, policy choices tend to vary according to market size.  
A country that has a sufficiently large market is often in a better 
position to utilize intellectual property protection to attract foreign 
direct investment.210  Such a country will also be able to use threats 
of compulsory licensing more effectively to induce foreign 
manufacturers to lower the price of drugs and other intellectual 
property-based goods and services.211  Given these multiple benefits, 
it is understandable why the drafters of the recently adopted Article 
31bis included language to support market aggregation and pooled 
procurement.212  This provision allows “a pharmaceutical product 
produced or imported under a compulsory licence . . . to be exported 
to the markets of those other developing or least developed country 
parties to [a qualifying] regional trade agreement that share the health 
problem in question.”213 
                                                                                                               
 209 Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 345, 346 (2008) (footnote omitted); see also Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. 
Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and 
Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 921, 973–77 (2007) (discussing the potential benefits of pooled procurement strategies 
and the establishment of regional pharmaceutical supply centers); SISULE F. MUSUNGU ET 
AL., UTILIZING TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION THROUGH SOUTH-
SOUTH REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS, at xv-xvi (2004) (advocating the establishment of “regional 
procurement systems where they would jointly conduct tendering through an entity acting 
on their behalf and a central purchasing agency managing the purchases on behalf of all the 
member countries”); id. at 70–73 (discussing regional procurement systems). 
 210 See Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and 
Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REV. 249, 266 (2003) (“If [Keith] Maskus is 
correct that strengthening intellectual property law will increase import volumes, then a 
developing country with an adequate number of consumers may eventually see some direct 
investment following the successful exploitation of product markets.” (footnote omitted)); 
Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 116, at 177 (stating as one of the condition for the intellectual 
property system to attract foreign direct investment that “the country . . . ha[s] a sufficiently 
large market to enable foreign firms to capture economies of scale or scope”). 
 211 See Peter K. Yu, Virotech Patents, Viropiracy, and Viral Sovereignty, 45 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1573, 1579 (2013) (noting as one of the factors for Brazil’s success in threatening to 
issue compulsory licenses in the pharmaceutical context its “lucrative middle class market 
that U.S. pharmaceutical companies cannot afford to lose or alienate”). 
 212 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 118, art. 31bis(3). 
 213 Id. The qualification is that “at least half of the current membership of [that 
agreement] is made up of countries presently on the United Nations list of least developed 
countries.” Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
In fall 2013, China launched the BRI, raising a series of 
questions concerning what this new initiative would mean to the 
Asia-Pacific region and the outside world.  Although the Chinese 
government’s guiding document, Vision and Actions, has provided 
some clarity to the initiative’s core objectives and geographical reach, 
commentators remain divided over the BRI’s overall benefits, 
potential drawbacks, and future impacts.  Many of these 
commentators also encounter considerable analytical challenges 
when they examine this fast-evolving and highly malleable initiative. 
In view of the very limited analysis the BRI has thus far 
attracted from intellectual property commentators, this Article 
devotes the space provided by the present Symposium to explore the 
initiative’s potential development in this area.  Showing how this 
initiative has not yet attracted much concrete policy formulation, the 
Article underscores the opportunity to shape the BRI’s future in the 
intellectual property area.  Specifically, this Article identifies six 
possible areas of cooperation, whose in-depth exploration could 
deepen our understanding of the BRI and its potential impact on 
international and regional intellectual property norm setting. 
Even with all the detailed analysis provided in this Article, 
some commentators will still worry about the problems and 
challenges brought about by this new initiative.  Finding the motives 
behind the BRI highly suspicious and potentially alarming, these 
commentators will question whether the initiative will enhance 
China’s power at the expense of other countries along the Belt and 
Road.  They will also explore whether the initiative will greatly 
undermine the structural integrity and continued vitality of existing 
international and regional intellectual property systems.  Given the 
historical conflicts and border disputes in the Asia-Pacific region214 
and the highly polarized nature of any debate on China policy, these 
worries and fears are not difficult to understand. 
Unlike the commentators in the first camp, some 
commentators will be excited about the BRI’s promise and ongoing 
development.  For those in China, this initiative will greatly enhance 
                                                                                                               
 214 See Yang Danzhi, Situations in Southeast Asia and Constructing Maritime Silk Road, 
in CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVES, supra note 8, at 157, 160 (noting the tensions 
between China and its neighbors—most notably, the Philippines and Vietnam—in the South 
China Sea). 
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the country’s integration with the outside world while generating new 
opportunities for outbound investment.215  The BRI will also help 
rejuvenate the country, bringing benefits that are comparable to those 
generated for centuries by the ancient Silk Road.216  Even for those 
outside China, the drive for greater connectivity and regulatory 
coordination along the Belt and Road seems to be, on balance, 
desirable.217  While greater integration into the global economy will 
undoubtedly enhance China’s power, such integration will also 
benefit the world.  Issues relating to trade, investment, and 
development do not always play out as zero-sum games. 
Finally, a third camp exists and holds positions that are 
somewhere in between.  While commentators in this camp remain 
excited about the BRI’s prospects, they are equally worried about its 
well-documented perils.  Given the yin-yang mentality commonly 
found in China-related analysis,218 and the tremendous complexity 
within China,219 these commentators feel comfortable reconciling the 
                                                                                                               
 215 See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. I (stating that the BRI “will help align 
and coordinate the development strategies of the countries along the Belt and Road, tap 
market potential in this region, promote investment and consumption, create demands and 
job opportunities”). 
 216 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 217 See VISION AND ACTIONS, supra note 9, pt. I (stating that the BRI is aimed at 
“encouraging the countries along the Belt and Road to achieve economic policy coordination 
and carry out broader and more in-depth regional cooperation of higher standards”). 
 218 See generally Peter K. Yu, Clusters and Links in Asian Intellectual Property Law 
and Policy, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN LAW 147, 148 (Christoph Antons ed., 2017) 
[hereinafter Yu, Clusters and Links] (“[T]here is no easy way to discuss intellectual property 
developments in Asia without also mentioning their complexities.”); Peter K. Yu, 
Intellectual Property, Asian Philosophy and the Yin-Yang School, 7 WIPO J. 1 (2015) 
(discussing the application of the Yin-Yang school and correlative thinking to the intellectual 
property field); see also CHEN JIANFU, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 10 
(2008) (noting the influence of Yin-Yang Jia on traditional Chinese conceptions of law). 
 219 As David Shambaugh observed: 
China remains a deeply conflicted rising power with a series of 
competing international identities. Many new voices and actors are now 
part of an unprecedentedly complex foreign-policymaking process. 
Consequently, China’s foreign policy often exhibits diverse and 
contradictory emphases. Understanding these competing identities is 
crucial to anticipating how Beijing’s increasingly contradictory and 
multidimensional behavior will play out at the world stage. Each 
orientation carries different policy implications for the United States and 
other nations. 
David Shambaugh, Coping with a Conflicted China, 34 WASH. Q. 7, 7 (2011); see also 
Mayer, supra note 18, at 7 (“One reason China has not yet developed a clear self-
understanding is because of the country’s ambivalent nature. It can be seen as both weak and 
strong. Its character is both ‘developed’ and ‘developing.’ China is both backwards and 
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seemingly diametrically opposed views of the two previous camps.220  
Knowing that the BRI will provide both benefits and drawbacks, 
these commentators recommend countries along the Belt and Road to 
participate in the initiative with their eyes open.  As one commentator 
warned, “one should remember the adage ‘Be careful what you wish 
for.’”221 
There are strong arguments to support the views of each 
camp, and this Article does not opine on whether the view of one 
camp is superior to, or more supportable than, the others.  Oftentimes, 
the analysis will depend on one’s worldview, ideological values, and 
policy preferences.  Nevertheless, before we can determine which 
camp best reflects our preferred position, we will need a deeper 
understanding of the BRI.  If this Article can help develop this crucial 
understanding—in the intellectual property area, in particular—it will 
have accomplished its mission. 
                                                                                                               
cutting edge at the same time.”); Yu, Clusters and Links, supra note 218, at 148 (noting “the 
duality—or the yin and yang—inherent in Asian societies”); Peter K. Yu, International 
Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 1, 25–26 (discussing China’s schizophrenic position in the international intellectual 
property arena). As I noted in the intellectual property context: 
China is “a country of countries.” The country is large, complex, diverse, 
and “sometimes internally contradictory.” The Chinese speak different 
languages, enjoy different cuisines, grow up with different cultures, and 
subscribe to different historical and philosophical traditions. Conditions 
in Beijing are often very different from those in Guangzhou, intellectual 
property strategies that are effective in Shanghai are likely to fail in a 
village in Guizhou, and the trade patterns found near the coasts are very 
different from those found inland. 
Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1118 (2011). 
 220 See Li & Duarte, supra note 112, at 282 (“Heuristically, the phenomenon of a set of 
persistent ‘bifocal lenses’ of opportunity-threat in studying the impact and implication of the 
rise of China . . . helps us to develop a multi-dimensional approach to understanding the 
multi-facets of China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative.”). 
 221 Nora Fisher Onar, Former Empires, Rising Powers: Turkey’s Neo-Ottomanism and 
China’s New Silk Road, in RETHINKING SILK ROAD, supra note 8, at 177, 188 (emphasis 
omitted). 
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